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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This report has been prepared as part of the 
Sustainable Development Commission’s 
work on examining the role of nuclear 
power in the low carbon economy.  
It covers matters relating to safety and 
security, under four main topic headings. It 
has examined relevant material in the public 
domain, and has reached the following 
conclusions for the topics under review: 
 
1.2 Accident risk 
• Nuclear power stations in the UK are 
designed to stringent standards with 
emergency arrangements to avoid on-
site and off-site effects, and  which 
ensure that all reasonably practicable 
steps are taken to avoid accidents, and 
to mitigate the consequences of any 
that might occur. 
• Nuclear power stations are designed so 
that safety equipment is duplicated and 
segregated resulting in a robust 
approach and practice of the engineered 
system response to abnormal operation 
and fault conditions. The current safety 
assessment principles state that safety 
equipment should be actuated 
automatically, and that no human action 
should be necessary for at least 30 
minutes. 
• UK civil nuclear power stations have an 
excellent safety record (although this is 
on the basis of relatively few reactor 
years of operating experience) , and 
there have been no events recorded 
either with off-site consequences or 
where all safety measures had been 
exhausted (the 1957 Windscale accident 
occurred at a military reactor). 
• Modern reactor designs are expected to 
reduce the very small accident risks still 
further. Wherever possible, passive 
safety systems are used in preference to 
engineered ones. 
 
 
1.3 Security issues – vulnerability 
to terrorism 
• There are high levels of security at 
nuclear power stations, which are 
regularly reviewed against current 
intelligence about the intents and 
capabilities of terrorist groups. 
• While modern reactor designs have 
substantial containment buildings which 
are considered unlikely to be breached 
even by a crashing airliner, and the 
reactor fuel is protected against impact 
and fire by other structures, no current 
operating reactor design has been 
specifically designed to resist 
commercial aircraft impact – the 
Generation III EPR and AP series reactors 
have yet to have anti-terrorist measures 
specifically designed in 
• Attempts at damaging the plant, either 
by external attack or sabotage, will 
probably cause the reactor to shut down 
safely once a fault is detected. 
However, it remains difficult to fully 
account for future changes in the modus 
operandi of terrorist groups and their 
capacity to exploit weaknesses in the 
design, operation or security of nuclear 
power stations and associated 
infrastructure. 
• Reactor fuel cannot be easily processed 
to produce weapons-grade material – 
but a ‘dirty-bomb’ can be made from 
reactor-grade material. The ceramic 
pellets are not easily fragmented, but 
could be used  in a ‘dirty’ bomb. 
• Spent fuel is transported in heavily-
shielded containers which have been 
successfully tested under conditions 
equivalent to a 30mph impact, although 
the one-off Magnox flask train collision 
demonstration is considered by some to 
be neither particularly demanding or 
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realistic. By their nature, these 
containers would be difficult to steal as 
they are heavy and cannot be moved 
quickly. Opening the containers without 
specialist equipment would expose the 
terrorists to life-threatening radiation, 
but this in itself could comprise a ‘dirty 
bomb’. 
 
1.4 Implications for nuclear 
proliferation 
• The UK is a signatory to and therefore 
bound by the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and the Euratom Treaty, and has agreed 
not to divert civilian nuclear materials to 
military use. 
• Any attempt by a future government to 
withdraw from its treaty obligations 
would raise suspicions about the 
intention, and cause an international 
response. 
• Independent international safeguards 
measures are in place at fuel 
manufacturing facilities, power stations 
and reprocessing facilities, to account 
for all nuclear material within the civil 
sector. These measures have proved 
effective over many years, and will be 
applied to any new-build stations. 
• However, terrorist organisations almost 
by definition operate outside  of 
national or international laws and 
treaties. Concerns remain about the 
wider uptake of nuclear power based on 
the emphasis on equity and non-
discrimination in the UNFCCC, and the 
governance arrangements within and 
between sovereign states to ensure the 
separation of civil and military 
applications or that radioactive 
materials do not fall into the ‘wrong  
hands’ 
• Pressurised water reactor fuel is 
unsuitable for weapons use – but if 
reprocessed, the plutonium extracted 
from light water reactor fuel is suitably 
fissile for nuclear warhead use . 
 
1.5 Health impacts from 
background radiation 
• Radiological protection of employees 
and the general public in the UK is 
covered by a strict legal framework. 
Permitted dose levels to the public, as a 
result of nuclear industry operations, are 
only a small fraction of natural 
background radiation. The average dose 
to a member of the public, due to 
radioactive discharges, is 0.015% of the 
annual average dose from all sources. 
• 83% of the EU collective dose 
attributable to the nuclear industry is 
due to discharges from fuel 
reprocessing. Spent fuel from new 
nuclear stations may not be 
reprocessed. 
• Dose levels to the public are expected 
to reduce from already low levels with 
modern reactor designs. The associated 
risk of developing a fatal cancer is 
extremely small, below the 1 in one 
million level considered ‘broadly 
acceptable’ by the HSE. 
• Nevertheless, several commentators 
raise concerns about the consequences 
of radioactive release from accidents 
and terrorist acts, including the front 
and back-end fuel cycle. Although the 
risks may be small, the consequences 
are significant. An understanding of the 
public perception of risk is at least as 
important as its  evaluation by experts.  
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2 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This report has been prepared as part of a 
study commissioned by the Sustainable 
Development Commission (SDC) into the role 
of nuclear power in the low carbon 
economy. The Government is conducting a 
fresh review of energy policy, and the SDC 
has therefore decided to conduct its own 
review of nuclear power, enabling it to 
update its position on the subject in advance 
of a formal consultation. 
 
The study covers five areas, each being the 
subject of a separate contract. This document 
covers matters relating to Safety and 
Security (Contract 3), and other studies (not 
necessarily by AMEC NNC) deal with 
Economics, Waste and Decommissioning, 
Public Perceptions and Community Issues, 
and Resource Availability. Some of the 
matters covered in this report may impinge 
on these other topics. 
 
For the purpose of the study, it is assumed 
that any new reactor will be an ‘advanced’i 
pressurised water reactor (PWR) or similar 
advanced reactor, in line with industry 
expectations. Candidate designs include the 
Westinghouse AP-1000 and the Framatome-
ANP EPR (European Pressurised [water] 
Reactor). This study makes no assumptions 
about possible locations for any new-build 
nuclear power station, although it is 
recognised that the site location may be 
relevant when considering some safety and 
security issues. 
 
For instance, the vulnerability to terrorist 
attack may depend on the site location and  
the source of any perceived threat, which 
could change over time. In the 1970s and 
afterwards, the possibility of Irish Republican 
i i.e. designs that differ from existing plants in 
the extent of the reliability on passive 
containment and close down systems, although 
the reactor and containment systems overall and 
in detail are not that ’advanced’ on existing 
designs 
terrorist strikes on sites at Heysham and 
Wylfa were assessed because of their 
proximity to ferry ports – but the threat was 
considered to be low because the Republican 
movement was confined and restrained by 
its own constituents (resident in Ireland, 
locally in the UK and as fund raising in the 
United States) who would have been subject 
to any radiation detriment arising from a 
terrorist action on a UK nuclear power plant. 
New terrorism threats require a full re-
evaluation of the risk to nuclear power 
installations, which has been ongoing since 
‘9/11’. 
 
Other considerations include the extent to 
which coastal locations could be 
compromised by the effects of changes in 
the climate that are already in the pipeline, 
including vulnerability of plant to sea level 
rise, storm damage and coastal erosion for 
several decades or hundreds of years hence. 
Site selection criteria should be ‘climate 
change-proofed’ – this is discussed further in 
Paper 2 – Landscape, environment and 
community impacts. 
 
At this stage, it is not known whether or not 
the spent fuel will be reprocessed. It is also 
not certain whether the reactor fuel will be 
uranium dioxide or mixed oxide (which 
comprises depleted uranium and fissile 
plutonium oxides, MOX). Where appropriate, 
both options will be considered, with 
appropriate caveats. 
 
This report covers four main topics: 
 
• Accident risk - record in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and in major overseas 
countries 
• Security issues (vulnerability to 
terrorism) 
• Implications for nuclear proliferation 
• Health impacts on workforce and local 
community from background radiation. 
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These topics are discussed in sections 2 to 5 
respectively. The conclusions from each 
section are contained in section 6. 
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3 ACCIDENT RISK 
 
 
 
3.1 UK regulatory position 
Within the UK, the operators of nuclear 
plants must conform to the general health 
and safety standards laid down in the Health 
and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HSW Act). 
The HSW Act applies to all employment 
situations, but nuclear plant operators must 
also comply with the Nuclear Installations 
Act 1965 (as amended) and related 
legislation. Under the Nuclear Installations 
Act, no site may be used for the purposes of 
installing or operating any nuclear 
installation unless a licence has been 
granted by the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE). The HSE exercises this responsibility 
through the Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate (NII), which is the nuclear 
safety regulator for the UK nuclear industry. 
Radioactive discharges are regulated 
separately, by the Environment Agency in 
England and Wales and the Scottish 
Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) in 
Scotland.  
 
The NI Act requires that no health harm shall 
arise from the operation of the nuclear 
facility. The NII interprets this in terms of the 
Acceptabi ity of the Risk of Accident and the 
Tolerability o  its Consequences, and, acting 
on behalf of the HSE, sets out the general 
safety requirements to deal with the risks on 
a nuclear site. This determines the general 
standards required which are set out in a 
number of documents discussed below 
including  the Site Licence (Site Licence 
Conditions - SLCs), Basic Safety Limits, Basic 
Safety Objectives and dose limits. Guidance 
on complying with NII requirements is set 
out in the Safety Assessment Principles 
(SAPs)1, which have been produced by the 
NII and reflect its approach to the regulation 
of risks. There are five fundamental 
principles, and over three hundred detailed 
principles which are derived from them. Two 
of the fundamental principles relate directly 
to accidents: 
 
• P4: All reasonably practicable steps shall 
be taken to prevent accidents 
• P5: All reasonably practicable steps shall 
be taken to minimise the radiological 
consequences of any accident 
 
Nuclear plants are designed to cope with a 
wide range of potential accidents (Design 
Basis Accidents - DBAs), for which it must be 
shown that off-site doses will not exceed 
specified limits. The predicted frequency of 
accidents that would result in doses to the 
public must also remain within limits. These 
limits become more onerous as the 
predicted off-site dose increases, so that an 
accident which would result in a large off-
site dose must have a very low probability of 
occurring. The limits are specified as Basic 
Safety Limits (BSLs) and Basic Safety 
Objectives (BSOs). BSLs are absolute 
minimum requirements, while BSOs must be 
met (or even exceeded) if it is reasonably 
practicable to do soii. 
 
Nuclear power plants are therefore designed 
to minimise the potential for accidents, and 
to minimise the consequences to both 
workers and the general population in the 
event that they do occur. This is reflected in 
the international nuclear event statistics 
discussed below, which record very few 
instances of significant off-site risk or major 
plant damage. 
 
ii Reasonably practicable means that ‘measures 
necessary to avert risk must be taken until or 
unless the cost ... whether in money, time or 
trouble, is grossly disproportionate to the risk 
that would be thereby averted’ (1, paragraph 1). 
This may also be expressed as the ALARP (As Low 
As Reasonably Practicable) principle. 
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3.2 Review of accidents in the 
nuclear industry 
The industry view is that accidents are 
extremely rare, and,when they have 
occurred, the significance of what happened 
(or did not happen) has not always been 
well-understood outside the industry. For 
instance, the Three Mile Island accident 
resulted in an almost-new reactor being 
written off, with major financial 
consequences for the plant operator.  
 
Although there were no off-site health 
effects, the primary containment was 
breached: the Kemeney Commission Report 
gives a radioactive release from the 
secondary containment with an estimated 
collective dose of 2000 man Rem. The dose 
exposure to workers over the reactor clean 
up program may have been sufficient to 
result in on-site detrimental effects.. 
 
The International Nuclear Event Scale (INES 2) 
has been developed by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and was 
introduced in 1990. It is a scale to put 
nuclear and radiological events into 
perspective, explaining in simple terms their 
significance and relative importance to the 
public. The INES is now used by over 60 
countries, including the UK. Events are 
graded on a scale 0 to 7,  and are assessed 
against up to three criteria: off-site impact, 
on-site impact and impact on defence-in-
depthiii (the extent to which safety 
protection has been degraded), as shown in 
Table 1.  
 
The scale is designed for prompt use 
following an event, but on occasions it may 
be necessary to give a provisional rating 
only. The level will then be confirmed, or 
iii Defence-in-depth can be considered as 
providing multiple physical barriers between the 
source of radioactivity and the environment, or a 
structured ‘series’ safety argument (‘if this 
happens, then that will happen, but if that fails, 
then this will take place...’ and so on), or a 
‘parallel’ or ‘multi-leg’ safety argument which 
demonstrates that the outcome can be achieved 
in several different ways. See also section 4.3. 
possibly revised, once the event has been 
fully assessed. However, critics argue that 
the INES serves more of a PR function than a 
meaningful index, pointing out that, like the 
Beaufort wind force scale, the INES has little 
meaning because the graduations are not at 
all linear and noting that the IAEA 
recommends3 that it should not be used for 
international comparisons. Some of the 
classifications are disputed, as discussed 
below for the Windscale incident in 1957. 
 
The vast majority of events that have been 
reported against INES criteria have been 
level 0, 1, or 2, and there have never been 
any events above level 2 at a UK civil 
nuclear power plant. The Windscale fire and 
release (at a military reactor) is given as 
INES level 5 (Table 2) although others 
consider it to have been INES scale 7 (the 
maximum level, and equivalent to 
Chernobyl) – these differences may result 
from the non-linear nature of the scale, 
inviting subjective interpretation of event 
characteristics. At level 2, there would be 
‘significant failure in safety provisions but 
with sufficient defence-in-depth remaining 
to cope with additional failures’. Examples of 
higher-level classifications are given in Table 
2, and summary descriptions of some of 
these incidents are given in 10. Table 3 lists 
the incidents at INES levels 0 to 3 that have 
been reported to the UK Government since 
the last quarter of 1996. These have been 
extracted from the HSE web-site, excluding 
those incidents which met the HSE criteria 
for reporting to Government but did not 
receive an INES rating. The reporting 
requirements were initiated in the late 
1970s by the then Secretary of State for 
Energy, Anthony Wedgwood Benn. 
 
Similar arrangements do not always exist in 
other countries, and where they do the 
reporting criteria may differ significantly 
from those applying in the UK. This will 
particularly affect the numbers of low-level 
incidents reported, although the treatment 
of more serious (Level 2 and above) 
incidents should be consistent across 
national boundaries. In France, the reporting 
criteria for significant events defined by the 
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Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN) were 
modified in 2002, and include environmental 
protection events such as releases of 
chlorofluorocarbons and high temperatures 
of discharged cooling wateriv. Although such 
events do not necessarily attract an INES 
rating, nevertheless one Level 2, 148 Level 1 
and 522 Level 0 incidents were declared in 
20034. The ASN annual reports do not cover 
all the Level 0 and Level 1 incidents in any 
detail, though individual incidents may be 
discussed, hence it is difficult to determine 
the reasons for the apparent discrepancy 
between the UK and France regarding these 
levels.v  It can be seen that, while there are 
many more Level 0 and 1 incidents recorded 
in France than in the UK, the number of 
Level 2 incidents is of a similar order of 
magnitude. 
 
The nuclear industry in Japan has suffered 
adverse publicity due to a sodium leak at the 
Monju fast reactor, two incidents at Tokai 
(including the criticality incident described in 
10) and a scandal relating to falsification of 
inspection records. The latter involved a 
lapse of management controls at 
Sellafield and a BNFL MOX fuel shipment to 
Japan which had to be sent back to the UK. 
Industry sources state that  the inspection 
iv This is a particular issue in France, where inland 
power stations discharge their coolant into large 
rivers such as the Seine and the Loire: all 
operating UK stations discharge cooling water 
into the sea. 
v The total of Level 1 incidents in France, at 
operating power stations only, was 116 in 1999, 
134 in 2000, 88 in 2001, 99 in 2002, 148 in 2003 
and 92 in 2004. The corresponding figures for 
Level 2 incidents were 3, 2, 2, 1, 1 and 1 for the 
same six years. There were no incidents rated at 
Level 3 or above. Over the same period, Table 3 
shows that two Level 0, seven Level 1 and one 
Level 2 incidents were reported to Parliament. It 
should be noted that France has 59 operating 
reactors, compared to the UK’s 23 in late 2005. 
The ASN report for 2003 identifies that about 
60% of the incidents (levels 0, 1 and 2) were 
attributable to organisational and human causes, 
and 21.3% were caused by equipment faults. Just 
1.2% of the incidents involved an accidental 
release of activity, but in all cases the releases 
were contained within the plant. 
issues were not safety-related5 – but others 
point out that the fuel pellets and cladding 
gap were not to specification., In any event,  
a significant loss of public confidence 
resulted. It has not proved possible to obtain 
comprehensive data on INES-rated incidents. 
 
Five of the accidents/incidents listed in Table 
2 occurred at power stations. Of the reactors 
involved, two (Saint-Laurent and Vandellos) 
were to a design no longer built (the French 
UNGG, not dissimilar to the UK Magnox 
design), one (Bohunice A1) occurred on an 
experimental reactor of a type since 
abandoned, and one (Chernobyl) was to a 
design long considered unlicensable (Amec-
NCC) in the UK (Reactor Bolshoy 
Moshchnosty Kanalny - RBMK - or high-
power channel reactor). Apart from 
Chernobyl, no nuclear workers or members 
of the public have died as a result of 
exposure to radiation due to a commercial 
nuclear reactor incident6. Most of the serious 
radiological injuries and deaths that occur 
each year are the result of large uncontrolled 
radiation sources, such as abandoned 
medical or industrial equipment.  
 
There have also been a number of accidents 
in experimental reactors and in one military 
plutonium-producing pile (Windscale, 1957), 
but, according to industry sources, none of 
these resulted in loss of life outside the 
actual plant or long-term environmental 
contamination6 - although this is disputed. A 
fatality was recorded at the Idaho SL-1 
reactor in January 1961. 
 
Particularly following the Three Mile Island 
(PWR) accident, which was rated as INES 
level 5, reactor designers have striven to 
limit the potential for core damage under 
accident conditions. Increasingly, PWR 
designs rely on passive features (which use 
natural forces such as gravity, natural 
circulation and compressed gas) rather than 
engineered features to assure safety 
functions. Where engineered systems cannot 
be avoided, the standard engineered system 
design principles of diversity and redundancy 
(‘defence in depth’) apply (as they are on 
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most hazardous plants including the UK AGR 
reactors designed in the 1960s), so that: 
 
• there are at least two ways of dealing 
with any identified fault, that do not 
rely on each other for any part of their 
operation 
• there are multiple, segregated sets of 
safety equipment, each one with the 
capability of dealing with the fault on its 
own. 
 
As a result, the manufacturers’ claims for 
their products suggest that the risk of core 
damage is very much less than for current 
designs. For instance, the Westinghouse 
AP1000 is claimed to have a core damage 
frequency (corresponding to a level 4 event) 
nearly 100 times below that for current 
plants, and 250 times lower than the 
frequency required by the United States (US) 
regulator7. 
 
Although fuel from Sizewell B - the UK’s first, 
and so far only, PWR used for electricity 
production (the Royal Navy has operated 
PWR powered propulsion systems for its 
submarine flotillas since 1965) - is currently 
not reprocessed, this remains as an option 
for new-build power stations. Many (though 
not all) of the incidents recorded in Table 3 
for reprocessing plant relate to the old 
Magnox facilities that are due for closure 
around 2012, and are therefore of less 
relevant to plant built to modern standards 
(i.e. in accordance with the requirement of 
the Nuclear Installations Act to reduce the 
risk to a low as reasonably practicable). 
Inspection of Table 3 (page 53) shows that 
none of the incidents listed there resulted in 
the release of activity off site, and in most 
cases the release was contained within the 
building in question. 
 
3.3 Summary  
While it may not be possible to eliminate all 
risk, the regulatory requirement is that risks 
have be shown to be acceptable and the 
consequences have to be tolerable, and that 
any accident with potentially large off-site 
consequences must be shown to have a very 
low frequency of occurrence. 
 
Modern nuclear power stations are built to a 
high standard, with multiple layers of 
protection to guard against faults and 
passive safety features which will come into 
play automatically when a fault condition 
occurs. As will be apparent from Table 2, 
some of the more serious accidents were 
due, in part, to human error – notably, 
Chernobyl which resulted when workers 
were under pressure to perform an 
experiment even though the load 
requirements of the plant were changed 
(Annex A). Current practice is to remove the 
need for prompt operator action and, with it, 
the potential for the wrong action to be 
taken. Ref 1, Safety Assessment Principle 77 
states that a safety system should normally 
be automatically initiated, and that no 
human action should be necessary for 
approximately thirty minutes. Nevertheless, 
some commentators argue that it remains 
difficult to completely rule out human error 
whatever the cause – these faults are often 
easier to evaluate with the benefit of 
hindsight. 
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4 SECURITY ISSUES 
 
 
 
4.1.1 Motivation and nature of terrorist 
threats 
Some of the risks of terrorist attacks on 
nuclear facilities are discussed in8. There 
could be several possible motives for a 
possible terrorist attack on a nuclear power 
station. They will depend on the group or 
groups involved, and on their political aims. 
It could take up to ten years, following a 
public enquiry, eventual approval and the 
construction phase, before a new nuclear 
station will be ready to operate, and it could 
then be running for 40-60 years. Over that 
period, both the motives for and the nature 
of a terrorist threat could change. Currently, 
the perceived threat is generally linked to 
events in the Middle East, from terrorists 
with a desire to cause widespread death and 
destruction of ‘Western’ interests, and with a 
total disregard for their own lives. The 
situation in thirty years’ time may be 
different yet again. 
 
Although the detail of the threat will depend 
on the circumstances pertaining at the time, 
a number of general motives can be 
identified: 
 
• to cause widespread death and 
destruction by direct action 
• to acquire nuclear material which could 
then be used in an explosive device 
• to cause economic damage to the UK 
• to gain publicity for the group in 
question. 
 
Nuclear plants might be considered 
‘attractive’ targets for a number of reasons, 
including: 
 
• the potential to cause wide scale 
economic and social disruption 
• playing on the public fear and anxiety of 
radioactivity 
• the possibility of causing a ‘spectacular’ 
event. 
 
Various counter-measures are in place to 
combat these threats. Some of these are 
institutional (e.g. site security) and others 
are related to plant and equipment design.  
Section 3.3 presents two opposing views. 
The first is an industry view wherein  nuclear 
plant is robust, and the containment 
buildings are able to withstand external 
impacts from, in the worst case, a civil 
airliner. Attempts at causing a major release 
of activity from commando-style operations 
are considered likely to be frustrated by the 
fail-safe nature of the plant where, if a fault 
is detected, several systems are available to 
shut the reactor down safely. Nuclear fuel 
(fresh or spent) is considered technically 
unattractive for use in a classical fission 
weapon, and difficult to fragment in the way 
that would be intended in a ‘dirty’ bomb. 
The problem is perceived to be mainly one 
of publicity, even though the more sinister 
motives are unlikely to be realised. The 
second is more critical, challenging the 
industry view on almost every count. 
 
4.2 Nuclear security 
It is important to distinguish the probabilistic 
risk analysis (PRA) undertaken for accidents 
(that is unintelligent, random and 
unfocussed events) compared to terrorist 
actions which are intelligently driven, 
intentional events that seek out the 
vulnerabilities of the plant (and may also 
strive to disrupt or disable the emergency 
response actions to maximise the impact)9. 
The Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS) 
regulates security arrangements for the 
protection of nuclear and radioactive 
material, on civil nuclear sites and while 
being transported between sites. It is part of 
the Department for Trade and Industry, and 
operates under the Nuclear Industry Security 
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Regulations (2003) and associated 
legislation. It reports each year to the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 
most recently in10. 
 
The Nuclear Industry Security Regulations 
require civil nuclear operators to have site 
security plans in place, dealing with the 
measures for protection of sites and the 
nuclear material on them. The OCNS is 
responsible for approving these security 
arrangements, which include the 
deployment of armed police at designated 
power stations10 – a consequence of which is 
that not all nuclear plants have armed 
UKAEA police in attendance all of the time. 
 
In line with international best practice11, 
security measures are regularly reviewed 
against the Design Basis Threat, which is 
based on the best available intelligence 
about terror groups, their motives and 
capabilities – although the tragic events in 
London on July 7 illustrate the difficulties of 
designing a system to cover all eventualities 
especially unknown future modus ope andi. 
For obvious reasons, the Design Basis Threat 
is classified as Secret, and no further details 
can be published. However, different 
countries have different approaches to 
Design Basis Threat – for example in the US 
and France specific actions are taken into 
account whereas in the UK it is considered 
sufficient to have intelligence about the 
motives and intention of the terrorist. This 
could lead to different perceptions and 
assessments of threats. 
 
Access to nuclear power stations is tightly 
controlled. Measures to prevent or at least 
delay unauthorised access include: 
 
• double lines of fencing with razor wire, 
high intensity lighting and CCTV linked 
to a permanently-manned security 
building 
• turnstiles at personnel access points 
where entry and exit is only possible 
with a site-specific electronic pass 
• random searches of personnel and 
vehicles  
• double barriers at vehicle access points 
and chicanes to prevent the barriers 
from being rammed at high speed 
• additional barriers within the station to 
protect sensitive areas such as the 
reactor building, to which only certain 
personnel will have access. 
 
These measures may not always deter the 
determined intruder, but will delay access to 
sensitive areas, to buy enough time to both 
shut down the reactor and limit any possible 
release, and to mobilise off-site counter-
terrorist measures. 
 
There have been instances of intrusions by 
groups protesting about nuclear power (e.g. 
Greenpeace), who have used such events to 
highlight supposed breaches in nuclear 
security. The activities of groups such as 
Fathers for Justice, though so far not directed 
at the nuclear industry, also pose security 
concerns. Some of the Greenpeace incursions 
at Sizewell in 2002-3 were conducted with a 
large number of activists, and OCNS claims 
that they were different in character and 
scale from a possible terrorist attack, which 
would be conducted with far fewer 
participants who would seek to avoid 
detection for as long as possible. The second 
Greenpeace incursion into Sizewell B was by 
a group of 11 campaigners in the early hours 
of the morning without the glare of publicity 
– Greenpeace’s intrusion was modelled on 
the NRC Design Basis Threat scenario for an 
armed insurgency group. Although the 
Sizewell incidents were identified as a 
demonstration, and the authorities reacted 
accordingly, attempts by terrorists to 
infiltrate protest groups cannot be ruled out, 
and armed police could be faced with the 
dilemma of whether or not to use extreme 
force if the nature of the incident was not 
immediately obvious8. As a result, OCNS is 
pressing for legislation to make unauthorised 
entry into licensed nuclear sites a specific 
offence10. 
 
OCNS supervises a comprehensive personnel 
clearance programme (‘vetting’), which is 
undertaken to minimise the possibility of 
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stations being infiltrated by untrustworthy 
individuals. This was extended in January 
2005 to encompass all personnel working 
within the perimeter fence of a nuclear 
power station (including secretarial, 
administrative and cleaning staff amongst 
others), not just those requiring access to a 
radiologically-controlled area or inner 
security barrier. Personnel without such 
clearance are not permitted unescorted 
access to site. 
 
4.3 Design of plant 
A full discussion of this subject should 
consider existing plants, both nuclear power 
and the front and back-end fuel plants, and 
the so-called Generation III nuclear power 
plants. 
 
Areas where nuclear fuel is present (the 
reactor itself and spent fuel stores) are 
mostly protected by heavily-reinforced 
concrete buildings. The main exception is 
with the existing Magnox steel reactor 
pressure vessel designs (Sizewell A, 
Dungeness A etc) in which the reactor 
primary circuit extends outside the  concrete 
biological shield (which vents to atmosphere 
and is not a pressure vessel) and this part of 
the primary circuit is entirely unprotected 
against aircraft impact. A typical PWR 
containment building is cylindrical, with a 
domed roof, and has walls some 1 to 1.5 m 
thick, with an internal steel liner. The 
buildings are designed to withstand 
earthquakes, forces generated by postulated 
internal explosions and, in some parts of the 
world, hurricane force winds. Before 9/11, 
they were only specifically designed against 
the impact of a light aircraft – i.e. aircraft up 
to 2.7 tonnes gross weight and with the 
assumption that the pilot will endeavour to 
steer clear of hazardous parts of the plant12 - 
However, in meeting the requirements 
mentioned above, the buildings could 
withstand much larger aircraft impacts – 
although no current operating reactor design 
has been specifically designed to resist 
commercial aircraft impact and the 
Generation III EPR and AP series reactors 
have yet to have anti-terrorist measures 
specifically designed in13. A report by the 
mainly industry-funded Electricity Power 
Research Institute (EPRI) in the USA, 
summarised in14, showed that a Boeing 767-
400, impacting at 350 mph, would not 
breach the containment structure. Any future 
reactor to be constructed in the UK will be 
specifically assessed against the possibility 
of impact by a large commercial aircraft – 
although concerns remain about the existing 
nuclear power and fuel plants. 
 
Assuming that the modus operandi of future 
terrorist attacks is similar to that of ‘9/11’, 
then the potential threat to nuclear plant 
may be small. Compared with either the 
World Trade Center or the Pentagon building, 
a containment building is a relatively small 
target, close to the ground (Figure 1). It 
would be difficult for a trained commercial 
pilot to control a large airliner at 350 mph 
near to ground level14, so it is less likely that 
a terrorist, possibly with only basic training 
and minimal experience, would be able to 
impact the building at the most onerous 
impact site. Furthermore, although it is not 
shown in Figure 1, the containment building 
is surrounded by other buildings, making a 
direct hit on the containment even more 
difficult to achieve. 
 
The OCNS has been working with operating 
companies and the NII on measures to 
counter the risk of a deliberate large aircraft 
crash15, though details may not be disclosed 
for security reasons. While these measures 
relate to existing nuclear plant, they can be 
expected to apply to any new-build power 
station. 
 
Figure 2, also taken from Ref14, shows a 
typical light water reactor containment 
building (actually a Boiling Water Reactor 
(BWR), though the general layout is not 
dissimilar to that of a PWR). It shows that 
the reactor pressure vessel (which contains 
the fuel) is low down inside the containment 
building, and protected by further reinforced 
concrete structures. The vessel itself is 
several inches thick, so is built to withstand 
considerable forces and will withstand 
significant impacts. 
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It can be seen, therefore, that if a crashing 
airliner did penetrate the containment 
building14 suggests would be most unlikely), 
there are still substantial barriers to prevent 
an uncontrolled release of radioactivity. Most 
of the energy would be used up in the initial 
impact, leaving the contents of the 
containment building largely undamaged.vi16
 
However, this line of reasoning is not 
comprehensive for the following main 
reasons: 
 
• it fails to explore and understand the 
way that the civil engineering structures 
react to and dissipate impact; 
• it doesn’t take into account the 
penetration capacity of hard missiles 
from the aircraft, such as turbine shafts, 
undercarriage spars, which may 
themselves be able to penetrate the 
reactor and fuel storage pond 
containments; and, 
• it incorrectly assumes that the terrorists’ 
modus operandi would be the same as 
the ‘9/11’ attacks, rather than targeting 
a specific vulnerability in, for example, 
plant design, operation or security  – the 
‘9/11’ attack was targeted at buildings 
which were successfully demolished, 
thus Al queada correctly identified the 
vulnerability of the World Trade Towers 
vi In an appraisal for Greenpeace of the EPR to be 
built at Okliluoto, Finland, Large states that the 
original EPR containment was not specifically 
designed to withstand any impact greater than a 
light aircraft crash16. While this is technically 
correct, in practice the conditions that the 
containment was designed to meet were more 
severe than the specific hazard of an accidental 
light aircraft impact. Although details of the EPR 
containment design have not been released, 
drawing adverse comment from Large, the 
analysis summarised in14 strongly suggests that 
pre-9/11 designs are strong enough to withstand 
the deliberate crash of a large commercial 
aircraft. Any specific  
assessments in the light of 9/11 can be expected 
to confirm this. It should be no surprise that the 
design authorities refused to release sensitive 
design details on security grounds. 
and obviously had a good 
understanding of the structure to 
identify the optimum impact zone. 
 
As noted in section 2.1, UK nuclear power 
stations have to meet NII requirements as 
expressed in the SAPs. One of the most 
important principles on which modern 
nuclear plants are based is ‘defence-in-
depth’, whereby several different systems 
perform the same function, so that the 
plant safety does not rely on any single 
feature. This involves three concepts: 
 
• redundancy (multiple ways of shutting a 
reactor down, providing fuel cooling, or 
multiple barriers to contain any release) 
• diversity (ensuring that systems with 
the same function are not designed in 
the same way or do not rely on 
common features, so that a particular 
fault on one system does not affect 
other systems) 
• segregation (reducing the possibility of 
a common hazard, such as fire, 
damaging more than one system). 
 
The SAPs were not designed to assess 
security threats, but many of the measures 
taken to enhance safety also provide 
defence against terrorist attack8.  
 
‘Defence-in-depth’ means that terrorists 
would have to damage several systems or 
components to cause a significant release of 
activity, with the possibility that an 
immediate reactor shutdown would be 
caused once a fault on one safety system 
had been detected – although others point 
out the possibility that an active insider 
might sabotage the plant by arranging for it 
to cascade down a self-destructive path. It is 
unlikely that a terrorist group, acting without 
inside assistance, would have the detailed 
knowledge required to disable enough 
safety systems to cause a major uncontrolled 
release, without the resulting disruption 
initiating a reactor shutdown – although it’s 
difficult to rule out the possibility that a 
passive insider could not be a long 
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established employee acting as an 
undetected sleeper in the plant. 
 
4.4 Shipments of radioactive 
materials and wastes 
Both fresh and spent fuel are transported to 
and from power stations under appropriate 
security arrangements. Fresh fuel presents 
no particular radiation hazards and is 
delivered by road, whereas spent fuel is 
highly radioactive and has to be transported 
in heavily-shielded flasks, by road to the 
nearest railhead and then by rail to 
Sellafield. At present, it is uncertain whether 
or not spent fuel from any new build nuclear 
station will be reprocessed. If it is not, it will 
remain at the power station until such times 
as a national repository is available. In the 
meantime consideration may need to be 
given to the management of spent fuel 
accumulating in the station fuel ponds to 
avoid the possibility of it becoming a large, 
effectively uncontained, radioactive source. 
 
Fresh fuel has no attractions for the terrorist 
(but see next paragraph for a discussion on 
unirradiated MOX fuel). It is only enriched to 
4% uranium-235 (the isotope of uranium 
that takes part in fission reactions), whereas 
weapons-grade material has to be extremely 
pure, in excess of 90% uranium-235. 
Furthermore, the fuel is in the form of 
ceramic pellets, which are extremely hard, 
and difficult to process (they can only be 
dissolved in very strong acid).  
 
Compared with uranium ores or metal, they 
are unattractive as a starting-point for 
producing weapons-grade material. Because 
fresh fuel is only weakly radioactive, it 
would have little value in a ‘dirty bomb’, and 
the ceramic pellets are resistant to 
fragmentation – although the use of such 
materials could nonetheless be used to play 
on public fears and anxieties over 
radioactive materials. 
 
However, unirradiated MOX fuel contains 
significant quantities of plutonium-239 
which is the highly fissile material capable of 
providing the fissile pit of a nuclear 
warhead. The United States Department of 
Energy considers MOX fuel to be ‘Stored 
Weapons Standard’ and thus requires the 
utmost standards of security during 
transportvii. 
If it is decided that spent fuel should be 
reprocessed, it is possible that a shipment 
from the station to the reprocessing plant 
could be attacked en route, either to spread 
contamination over a wide area or to steal 
the material for future use in a nuclear 
weapon. Spent fuel containers are robust 
and undergo stringent testing, including 
dropping onto rigid surfaces (the equivalent 
of a 30 mph impact) and steel spikes, 
immersion in deep water, and an 800°C fire 
(in accordance with IAEA TS-R-1). One-off 
tests have also been carried out, such as 
crashing a train travelling at 100 mph into a 
Magnox flask - although some consider this 
to be neither particularly demanding or 
realistic. The industry argues that the pellets 
themselves are not easily dispersed even 
under severe impact and fire, and any 
intention to contaminate the surrounding 
area is unlikely to be achieved.  
 
However, the IAEA Transport Safety 
Standards Advisory Committee (TRANSACC) 
has yet to accept MOX to be within this 
transport category, so Type B(M) 
transportation flasks are a prerequisite for its 
transport in order to minimise its release and 
vii See NRC Hearing Disposition of Surplus 
Weapons Plutonium Using Mixed Oxide Fuel, US 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Hearing, 2004:    
• Comments on Opinion on the 
Applicability and Sufficiency of the 
Safety, Security and Environmental 
Requirements and Measures as these 
Apply to the Transatlantic Shipment, 
European Waters and France         
• The Role of PNTL Ships in the Atlantic 
Transit Phases, United States of America 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 26 
November 2003,         
• Summary of the Findings of the French-
sourced Plutonium Dioxide 
Transportation, 23 March 2004, 
http://www.largeassociates.com/NRC1.
pdf 
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airborne dispersion upon failure of the flask 
containmentviii. 
 
A container for spent PWR fuel weighs 
around 100 tonnes and is several metres 
long, which makes theft and subsequent 
concealment extremely difficult. Anyone 
opening the container to extract the fuel 
would subject themselves to life-threatening 
radiation doses before they could carry out 
any operations on the fuel itself – although 
this is unlikely to deter a fanatic especially if 
death were not immediate. Even then, the 
fuel could not easily be processed. However, 
the container could in itself make for a dirty 
or radiological bomb (NRPB study). 
The IAEA itself recognises the transportation 
stage of nuclear and radioactive materials to 
be particularly vulnerable to terrorist attack, 
calling for special arrangements, especially 
for Category 1 materials17. 
 
Analysis and tests have demonstrated that 
the transportation flasks are vulnerable to 
terrorist actions, both from shaped or 
propelled explosive charge18 from fire being 
deliberately set when the flask(s) are 
trapped within a confined space19 such as a 
tunnel or ship hold, generally with the 
security arrangements overall for the 
transportation of new, unirradiated MOX fuel 
and spent fuel20 and acts of sabotage21. 
 
viii The substance qualifies as LDM if, during and 
following the tests, does not release an amount 
of activity greater than 100 times the A2 index in 
gaseous and particulate forms of up to 100 
microns in diameter - Requirements for Very Low 
Dispersible Material (VLDM), TC-946, F Lange, F 
Nitsche, F-W Collin and M Cosack, Working Paper 
No 11, IAEA Technical Committee Meeting, 
Vienna, 15-19 May 1995 5 
Large J H, Review of the Sea Transportation of 
Mixed Oxide Fuel: i) Transportation Risks and 
Hazards , ii) Physical and Dispersion 
Characteristics of MOX Fuel, iii) MOX Fuel, a UK 
Perspective, Evidence to the New Zealand 
Government Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Select Committee, May 2001 
http://www.largeassociates.com/R3063-
MOX1.pdf . . ./ R3063-MOX2.pdf . . . / R3063-
MOX3.pdf 
 
The risk posed by nuclear reactor spent fuel 
in transit is not so much absconding with it, 
but more a terrorist action that might entrap 
the flask(s), for example in a siding where 
an explosive charge might breach the 
containment22, or within a tunnel where the 
flask might be subject to fierce fire. 
Modelled by the National Radiological 
Protection Board (NRPB), a hypothetical 
terrorist attack on a PWR spent fuel flask 
standing at Willesden Junction in London, 
gave one airborne dispersion condition 
prediction of 1,300 fatalities over the interim 
and longer terms23.
 
 
4.5 Summary  
Security at nuclear power stations has been 
under constant review since 9/11 and 
provisions have been strengthened as 
deemed necessary. Modern designs of 
nuclear power station are resistant to 
external attack, and the duplication of safety 
systems makes it likely that the reactor will 
be shut down safely even if some safety 
systems are disabled. However, it remains 
difficult to fully account for future changes in 
the modus operandi of terrorist groups and 
their capacity to exploit weaknesses in the 
design, operation or security of nuclear 
power stations and associated infrastructure. 
 
Security measures are reviewed against a 
Design Basis Threat, which is based on 
intelligence about the terror groups, their 
motives and capabilities – but different 
approaches to DBT may create different 
perceptions and evaluations of risk. 
Intelligence cannot be comprehensive, and it 
is possible that some threats can be 
underestimated or even overlooked 
altogether, as may have been the case with 
the London tube and bus bombers on 7 July 
2005. 
 
The possibility that a power station might be 
infiltrated by terrorists, who could then use 
knowledge gained in their work to disable 
critical safety systems, cannot be ruled out. 
Although it might,  take several years for 
such people to achieve the required 
knowledge, it’s possible that terrorist groups 
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and their raison d’être could persist for many 
decades. 
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5 IMPLICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
 
 
 
5.1 International treaty 
obligations 
5.1.1 General 
The materials used for both nuclear power 
generation and nuclear weapons 
manufacture are both ultimately derived 
from natural uranium – including sources 
such as MOX or plutonium which are derived 
from spent fuel. There are long-standing 
concerns that material and technologies 
intended for power generation could be 
diverted to weapons use, and several 
international treaties have been concluded 
to ensure either that this does not take place 
or that any attempts to do so are detected. 
Some of these treaties are regional in nature 
(e.g. the Treaty of Tlatelolco, covering South 
American states) while others concern the 
supply of uranium ores by non-nuclear 
weapons states such as Australia and Canada 
to other states. The two principal treaties 
that concern the UK are the 1970 Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT)24 and the Euratom Treaty25, to which 
the UK became a partner on joining the 
European Community in 1973. 
 
These are discussed below, but it should be 
noted that these obligations relate to the 
compliance of signatory states and not to 
the activities of terrorist groups (which, 
almost by definition, act outside of national 
or international laws). The view below 
represents an ‘industry’ view. A further 
section is added below as a commentary on 
proliferation concerns from a more critical 
perspective. 
 
5.1.2 The NPT 
The only states that have not signed the NPT 
are India, Pakistan and Israel, all of which 
are known to have nuclear weapons, while 
North Korea has chosen to withdraw from 
the treaty. Out of the 188 states that have 
signed the NPT, the UK is one of five 
declared Nuclear Weapons States (NWS), the 
others being France, the USA, the USSR and 
China. Along with the other four declared 
NWS, the UK has signed voluntary 
agreements with the IAEA26,27 which allow 
the Agency to apply safeguards to its civil 
nuclear activities, to verify that civilian 
nuclear material is not being diverted to 
military use. The Non-nuclear Weapons 
States (NNWS), who have agreed to use 
nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful 
purposes, also allow inspections of their civil 
facilities to confirm that there are no 
clandestine military programmes. 
 
The nature of the safeguards agreements 
has been refined over the years. Before the 
NPT came into force, the IAEA’s safeguards 
regime was defined in INFCIRC/6628. 
Following the NPT, comprehensive 
safeguards agreements have been made 
with many of the signatories, with voluntary 
offer agreements 26 applying to the five 
NWS. These agreements cover the 
application of safeguards at declared 
facilities, with the onus being placed on the 
NNWS (via the treaty itself) to declare all 
nuclear activities (the NWS may choose not 
to declare certain facilities on the grounds of 
national security). 
 
The weakness of the comprehensive 
safeguards agreements was that, if a state 
chose not to comply with its treaty 
obligations, and failed to declare certain 
nuclear facilities (as did Iraq in the 1990s), 
detecting the non-compliance was not 
straightforward.ix  Accordingly, a system of 
additional protocols was developed, which 
gives IAEA inspectors greater rights of access 
and requires administrative procedures to be 
streamlined so that, for instance, states 
ix Iraq probably had access to indigenous sources 
of uranium that were not declared, and was able 
to pursue a military goal without the need to 
divert nuclear materials from a parallel civilian 
programe. 
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cannot delay the issuing of visas as a means 
of delaying an unwanted inspection. The 
states also have to provide significantly 
more information, including details of 
nuclear-related imports and exports, which 
the IAEA is then able to verify. The five NWS 
have signed modified additional protocols 
27which reflect their particular status. 
 
Individual states can terminate their NPT 
agreement, as North Korea has done. Given 
that almost all states have signed the NPT 
(and those that have not done so have 
agreed to limited safeguards28), any 
withdrawal from the treaty would 
immediately raise suspicions of clandestine 
activities.x  There have been a few failures to 
detect undeclared nuclear activities. For 
instance, South Korea had conducted some 
experiments into the separation of uranium 
and plutonium in the 1980s, which were not 
declared at the time and only came to light 
in 200429. However, the IAEA has concluded 
that, without the NPT, there might be 
perhaps 30 to 40 NWS, and points out that 
more states have abandoned nuclear 
weapons programmes than started them30. 
 
It is also worth noting that all five of the 
declared NWS had developed nuclear 
weapons before beginning electricity 
generation from nuclear power. In India and 
Pakistan the development of nuclear 
weapons and nuclear power appears to have 
been concurrent, and in both cases the 
emergence of weapons programmes led to a 
cessation of overseas assistance with nuclear 
power development, at least by countries 
that had by then signed the NPT. Israel does 
not generate electricity using nuclear power. 
 
5.1.3 The Euratom Treaty 
The Euratom Treaty and its supporting 
regulations, specifically Commission 
Regulation (Euratom) 3227/7631, empowers 
the European Commission to verify that 
nuclear materials are not being diverted 
x For North Korea, the reverse was actually the 
case. Non-compliances were detected and the 
state decided to withdraw from the NPT, rather 
than put matters right. 
from their intended uses. This responsibility 
is exercised by the Euratom Safeguards 
Office (often known simply as ‘Euratom’), 
part of the Directorate-General for Energy 
and Transport. It is also required to ensure 
that member states comply with their 
international treaty obligations. 
Consequently, there is a degree of overlap 
between Euratom and the IAEA. 
 
There is no provision for a EU member state 
to withdraw from the Euratom Treaty. This 
could only be achieved by a general 
renegotiation of the treaty, which would 
then have to be ratified by all (currently 25) 
member states. Consequently, unless a 
major upheaval took place in the European 
political system, safeguards would be 
maintained in the event that a future UK 
government was minded to withdraw from 
the NPT. 
 
5.2 Application of safeguards at 
UK nuclear power stations 
Euratom applies a range of safeguards at 
both power stations and fuel fabrication and 
reprocessing plants, to ensure that civil 
nuclear material is not diverted to military 
use. These measures include materials 
accountancy, analysis, surveillance and 
inspections. The precise level of safeguards 
applied to each plant will depend on the 
activities taking place there. For instance, a 
power station with on-site spent fuel storage 
(interim or long-term) will be subject to 
accountancy audit, containment and 
surveillance measures (closed circuit 
television - CCTV, seals) and, if practicable, 
occasional re-verification (checking that 
identified fuel assemblies are still present). 
To avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, 
IAEA will generally only apply its own 
safeguards to verify that Euratom’s 
conclusions are correct. Discrepancies have 
emerged, for instance the European 
Commission identified shortfalls in 
accounting procedures at Sizewell32, the 
absence of an irradiated fuel element at 
Wylfa (believed to have been dispatched to 
Sellafield in error) and discrepancies 
involving elements shipped from Bradwell to 
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Sellafield. Any new-build nuclear power 
station will be subject to Euratom and IAEA 
safeguards requirements. The plant operator 
is required to supply Euratom with the 
plant’s technical characteristics, from which 
Euratom will determine how safeguards will 
be implemented. This is likely to include 
CCTV surveillance of fuel storage areas, with 
tamper-proof seals that can only be broken 
with the approval (and presence) of the 
inspectors. The inspectors will monitor 
refuelling operations which, on a modern 
PWR, will take place at 12-18 month 
intervals. This will confirm that fuel 
movements and disposals are in accordance 
with a predetermined plan and that there 
are no unexplained aspects (e.g. early 
removal of a fuel assembly) that could 
indicate an attempt at diverting material. 
 
5.3 Proliferation – a summary of 
more ‘critical’ perspectives 
A chief concern with reprocessing is that the 
plutonium could be diverted to develop 
nuclear weapons. Several industrial countries 
have, in the past, provided reprocessing as 
well as enrichment technology and services 
to other countries, raising concerns about 
increasing the opportunities for theft or 
transfer of technology, equipment, or 
products. (ref. Chicago study). Reprocessing 
is carried out in Belgium, China, France, 
Germany, India, Japan, Russia, Switzerland, 
and the UK. These countries engage in 
reprocessing to separate plutonium and 
uranium from fission products for further use 
as fuel for reactors (see Waste and 
Decommissioning). Direct disposal without 
reprocessing is carried out in the United 
States, Canada, Finland, South Korea, Spain, 
and Sweden.  
 
Although, as discussed above, the UK is itself 
not likely to directly aggravate proliferation 
issues as a result of replacement or 
enhancement of nuclear power, this remains 
an important issue for any UK decision 
because of the international implications of 
such a decision. These implications arise 
from the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change which 
indicates that if nuclear power is part of the 
solution to climate change for the UK, then it 
is a suitable solution for all countries based 
on the emphasis on equity and non-
discrimination in the Convention. For 
example, Article 4 – Commitments include:   
 
• “1c) Promote and cooperate in the 
development, application and diffusion, 
including transfer, of technologies, 
practices and processes that control, 
reduce or prevent anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases… in all 
relevant sectors, including the 
energy…”; and, 
• “5. The developed country Parties and 
other developed Parties included in 
Annex II shall take all practicable steps 
to promote, facilitate and finance, as 
appropriate, the transfer of, or access 
to, environmentally sound technologies 
and know-how to other Parties, 
particularly developing country Parties, 
to enable them to implement the 
provisions of the Convention.” 
 
The use of a nuclear reactor to produce 
military products is mainly a management 
choice depending on the duration and 
frequency of reactor shut-down that can be 
tolerated to extract the relevant feedstocks 
(see sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3). While 
transparency and scrutiny by a variety of 
stakeholders may preclude the use of 
commercial civil reactors for clandestine 
plutonium production in the UK, this cannot 
be guaranteed in all countries. 
 
In 1977 the USA decided not to reprocess 
spent fuel, largely due to concerns over 
nuclear proliferation because of the 
separation of pure plutonium by PUREX 
reprocessing. Although more proliferation-
resistant reprocessing techniques have since 
been developed, the USA continues to use a 
‘once-through’ fuel cycle in which spent fuel 
is treated and stored, or sent for 
reprocessing in other countries. 
 
A number of difficulties in the relationship 
between civil and military applications 
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continue to cause concern among many 
commentators33, including: 
 
• the difficulties of enforcing international 
treaty obligations; 
• proliferation risks associated with the 
widespread use of nuclear technologies 
in countries with very diverse systems 
of governance; 
• the resources available to enforce 
international obligations in a potentially 
growing number of states with a 
nuclear capacity; and, 
• how to deal with states that withdraw 
from treaties (e.g. North Korea) or 
develop nuclear capability outside of 
them, such as India, Pakistan and Israel, 
and the suspected development of a 
nuclear military capability in Iran. 
 
All of these lead to a general concern about 
making clear distinctions between civil and 
military uses of nuclear power especially 
where reprocessing is used. 
 
5.4 Safeguards activities 
This section discusses some of the processes 
designed to account for the amounts of 
radioactive materials entering and leaving 
various key stages in the fuel cycle. 
 
5.4.1 Declaration of basic technical 
characteristics 
The operator of any nuclear plant is required 
to submit design information to Euratom and 
the IAEA. These Basic Technical 
Characteristics include a description of the 
plant and the processes that take place 
within it, details of the arrangements for 
handling nuclear material, and a description 
of the materials accountancy system to be 
employed. From an understanding of the 
plant, the safeguards agency (Euratom or 
IAEA, as appropriate) will be able to 
determine the nature and extent of 
safeguards to be applied. It will also enable 
the agency to identify locations where 
material diversion or process interference 
could take place, and to apply appropriate 
measures. 
 
5.4.2 Materials accountancy 
It is desirable that knowledge of the quantity 
and whereabouts of nuclear material should 
be maintained as long as the material poses 
a potential threat to society. Nuclear 
material enters the safeguards system when 
it is separated from the naturally-occurring 
ores, and leaves only when the agency can 
determine that it has either been consumed, 
been diluted in such a way that it is no 
longer usable for weapons purposes, or 
become practically irrecoverable34. However, 
Barnaby (2005)35 argues that safeguarding 
plutonium and highly enriched uranium in a 
commercial reprocessing plant dealing with 
up to 10 tonnes a year is problematic: with 
acceptable measurement errors of 0.5-1%, 
50-100kg could be unaccounted for (as 
discussed further below). He further notes 
that about 13kg of reactor grade plutonium 
would be sufficient to make a crude nuclear 
device.  
 
Certificates are generated at all stages of the 
fuel cycle, and accompany the material 
through all stages from mining to final 
disposal. Essentially, they indicate the origin 
of the material, any particular safeguards 
obligations (restrictions placed on its use by 
the supplying state), quantity, chemical and 
isotopic composition, state of enrichment, 
storage location and date of transfer. As the 
material moves through the fuel cycle, the 
certification ‘bundle’ is added to, and 
completed fuel assemblies are marked with 
unique numbers that can be read and 
correlated with the certification. 
 
The power station operator will be obliged to 
maintain a system of nuclear materials 
accountancy, which is subject to scrutiny by 
the safeguards agency. This requires the 
setting up of Material Balance Areas, for 
which details of all material entering or 
leaving must be recorded. For a power 
station, the new fuel store, the reactor itself 
and the spent fuel ponds will be included. 
The system must include periodic inventory 
checks, the results of which must be 
reported to the agency. The agency will, in 
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turn, carry out audits of the accounting 
system, including (where appropriate and 
practicable) inspections to confirm the 
correctness of declared records. 
 
Materials accounting is less straightforward 
in the fuel manufacture and reprocessing 
sector, as indicated above. At power 
stations, keeping inventories is relatively 
simple, because the fuel exists in discrete 
assemblies. It is delivered, used, stored after 
use and (where appropriate) sent for 
reprocessing in fixed amounts. In fuel 
manufacture, materials accounting requires 
that, for instance, estimates are made of the 
amount of uranium that can be extracted 
from a given quantity of ore. The amount 
recovered never precisely matches the 
amount estimated in the ore. Similarly, 
quantities of uranium and plutonium 
reprocessed from spent fuel may not match 
the estimated amounts. Furthermore, there 
are uncertainties associated with measuring 
materials passing through a continuous 
process, since it is usually not possible to 
‘freeze’ operations to get a snapshot of what 
is present at any one time.  
 
For these reasons, materials accounting will 
include a proportion of Materials 
Unaccounted For (MUF). The MUF figures 
may indicate an apparent gain of material in 
some years, and a loss in others. The IAEA 
standard on uncertainties is 1% of the total 
throughput. The latest figures produced by 
BNFL (2005) represent 0.5% of throughput 
and have been accepted by Euratom as 
satisfactory36. 
 
5.4.3 Containment and surveillance 
Containmentxi and surveillance operations 
are performed to ensure that there is 
continuity of knowledge about nuclear 
material, in particular that it has not been 
removed or tampered with since it was last 
verified. These measures may include: 
 
xi In this context, ‘containment’ refers to the 
requirement to contain nuclear materials in 
specified locations, to which access for adding, 
inspecting or removing materials is controlled. 
• tamper-resistant seals at storage 
locations, which cannot be removed 
without the agency being notified  and 
an inspector witnessing any movement 
of material 
• the presence of inspectors on site to 
identify any suspicious operations 
• continuous surveillance of storage 
locations using CCTV or other electronic 
techniques 
• fitting monitors on potential exit routes, 
including those which would not 
normally be used (e.g. ventilation ducts) 
but might be employed for clandestine 
activities. 
 
Any indications of tampering (e.g. seal 
damage, cameras being turned off) would 
trigger investigations and, potentially, full 
inventory checks. 
 
5.5 Disincentives to diverting 
PWR fuel 
It is likely that any attempt to divert nuclear 
material to military use would be detected 
by the safeguards agencies. However, there 
are several reasons why such action would 
be unattractive, and these are discussed 
below. 
 
5.5.1 Difficulty of processing the fuel 
Irradiated PWR fuel consists of a matrix of 
fuel pins, composed of uranium dioxide (or 
occasionally MOX – although at present, no 
thermal reactors in the UK are licensed to 
burn MOX fuel) formed into hard, physically 
and chemically stable ceramic pellets, and 
then encased in a Zircaloy cladding. The 
pellets are difficult to fragment and have to 
be dissolved in strong nitric acid when 
undergoing reprocessing. Compared with 
uranium ores or metal, they are unattractive 
as a source material for producing weapons-
grade materials, although they could be 
used in crude reactor-grade devices as 
indicated below. However, should any 
diversion of material occur, it would 
probably take place earlier in the fuel cycle, 
when the extraction process would be much 
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less complicated. There is little point in 
fabricating fuel pellets and then reversing 
the process, at great expense and difficulty. 
However, others (e.g. Barnaby, see Footnote 
15) argue that the pellets themselves could 
be used for a crude device based on reactor-
grade material, and unirradiated MOX could 
be used to procure its plutonium content. 
Further, short burn fuel illicitly removed from 
the reactor core during an unscheduled 
outage would have a high Pu-239 yield that 
might be diverted to the unsafeguarded 
stockpile once reprocessed or chemically 
separated. Whilst unlikely in the UK, such 
matters do require consideration in the case 
of widespread uptake of nuclear power as 
discussed in Section 4. 
 
5.5.2 Unsuitability of spent fuel 
Uranium consists of two principal isotopes 
(atoms with the same atomic number - and 
therefore the same chemical behaviour - but 
different atomic weights), uranium-235 and 
uranium-238. As stated in section 4.4, only 
uranium-235 is of use for fission reactions, 
whether for producing power or explosions. 
As the fuel is burnt up in the reactor, the 
proportion of uranium-235 progressively 
reduces, making spent fuel even less 
attractive for producing weapons-grade 
material than fresh fuel at 4% enrichment. 
 
Although the majority uranium-238 content 
is not fissile, it is able to capture neutrons 
while in-reactor and eventually produce 
isotopes of plutonium. Plutonium-239 is 
fissile and has military applications, but 
weapons-grade plutonium is over 93% 
plutonium-239, whereas the plutonium in 
spent fuel is a lower grade as well as being 
intimately mixed with uranium and 
contaminated with other radioactive species. 
In some cases extraction of plutonium-239 
from spent fuel is only possible if the fuel 
removed from the reactor within a short 
time, and reprocessed promptly. This 
principle was used on the Windscale 
plutonium piles and the Magnox reactors at 
Calder Hall and Chapelcross, but this is less 
likely with PWR fuel, as discussed in section 
5.5.3. However, THORP has extracted 
quantities of Pu-239 from spent light water 
reactor (PWR and BWR) fuels. 
 
5.5.3 Inaccessibility of fuel when 
loaded in the reactor 
Once PWR fuel is loaded into the reactor, it 
cannot be removed while the reactor is 
operating. Unlike the UK gas-cooled reactors, 
which were designed to be refuelled on-load 
and have machines to remove individual 
assemblies or elements, the PWRs have to 
be shut down for refuelling. The vessel head 
(a substantial steel component weighing up 
to 100 tons) has to be unbolted and 
removed, and part of the reactor building 
must be flooded with water to provide 
personnel shielding. Only then can the spent 
fuel be removed. PWR refuelling outages 
take place every 12 to 18 months, and 
require significant planning, as well as extra 
personnel on site. Generally, one-quarter to 
one-third of the assemblies are removed, 
and the rest are repositioned (along with the 
new fuel) to optimise fuel burn-up. 
 
As noted in section 5.5.2, it is suggested that 
extracting plutonium from spent fuel for 
weapons use is only possible if the fuel is 
removed from the reactor after a few 
months of being loaded, before 
contamination by other radioactive species 
becomes excessive. This was achieved 
routinely on the Calder Hall and Chapelcross 
reactors (which were originally designated 
for military use, with power generation as a 
byproduct), but cannot be done on a PWR 
without shutting it down every few weeks. 
As is apparent from the previous paragraph, 
this would be extremely disruptive, and it is 
unlikely that either the preparations or the 
operations themselves could be concealed 
from the safeguards agencies. But this is 
essentially a management decision, and, as 
discussed in section 4, while transparency 
and scrutiny by a variety of stakeholders 
may preclude the use of commercial civil 
reactors for clandestine plutonium 
production in the UK, this cannot be 
guaranteed in all countries. 
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Further, the United States detonated a 
‘reactor-grade’ plutonium implosion type 
warhead in 1962, which demonstrates that 
plutonium need not be purified to ‘weapons-
grade’ to be used in a nuclear device 
(including a ‘dirty bomb’). Also, the inclusion 
of around 7% of impurities (mainly prompt 
isotopes of plutonium and the decay 
daughter Am-241) does not preclude this 
material being further refined or used 
straight in a nuclear device. 
 
5.5.4 Unfavourable economics 
As well as the on-site disruption, any 
reduction in output for clandestine fuel 
extraction would be extremely uneconomic 
(as would the replacement of assemblies 
intended for a 4-6 year dwell after a few 
months at best). Any new nuclear power 
station in the UK is likely to be provided 
commercially. Hiding the poor performance 
from shareholders, and the market in 
general, would need to be part of an 
elaborate cover, which would be very 
difficult for a public company. But as 
suggested above, this does not necessarily 
apply to all countries if nuclear power is 
taken up more widely, as discussed in 
Section 4. 
 
5.5.5 Conflict with declared intentions 
If a decision is taken not to reprocess the 
spent fuel, it will remain on site before 
being transported to a final repository. 
Consequently, there will be no need for 
movements of fuel off-site for many years. 
Spent fuel must be moved in heavily-
shielded containers, which need specialist 
heavy lifting equipment and wagons for 
transport by road or rail. It is unlikely that 
any off-site movements of spent fuel could 
be concealed, whether they took place early 
in the fuel life or at the end of a normal fuel 
dwell (ignoring the unsuitability of such 
material - section 5.5.2). Such movements, 
when none were expected, would be highly 
suspicious. However, as indicated above, the 
on-site storage facilities and transport 
containers could themselves be used as a 
‘dirty bomb’. 
 
5.6 Summary  
There are major technical difficulties 
involved in obtaining weapons-grade 
material from PWR fuel, and any diversion of 
nuclear material would be more practicable 
early in the fuel cycle, before the fuel had 
been made into pellets, and certainly before 
it reached a power station. However, the 
pellets themselves could be used for a crude 
device based on reactor-grade material, and 
unirradiated MOX could be used to procure 
its plutonium content. The safeguards 
measures that are in place have been 
effective to date in proving that materials 
diversion has not taken place. At some time 
in the future, a government could decide to 
withdraw from the NPT (as North Korea has 
done), but this would signal to the 
international community that something 
untoward was intended and would almost 
certainly result in international sanctions – 
although it can take many years to bring 
such breaches to a satisfactory conclusion. 
Withdrawal from the Euratom treaty is not 
possible, and any attempt to hinder Euratom 
inspectors from carrying out their duties 
would again raise suspicions. It is unlikely 
that either scenario would occur without a 
major breakdown in international order. 
It has not been decided whether or not 
spent fuel from any new-build nuclear 
power station will be reprocessed.  
 
Reprocessing of spent fuel is also subject to 
international safeguards, although there are 
concerns about the measurability of the 
stocks of plutonium and highly enriched 
uranium in a commercial setting dealing 
with large volumes of these materials. 
Comments above about potential withdrawal 
from international treaties also apply here, 
as do concerns about the effective 
implementation and policing of treaties. 
Otherwise, spent fuel will be despatched to 
a final repository after an undefined period 
in interim storage. It could potentially be 
retrieved from either an interim store or a 
final repository (depending on how 
inaccessible the final repository was made). 
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Some commentators (e.g. the MIT study on 
the Future of Nuclear Power, 
200337),consider that current international 
safeguards are inadequate to meet the 
security challenges of an anticipated global 
nuclear expansion. The concern is that fuel 
reprocessing systems as currently practised 
in Europe, Japan and Russia, has the 
potential to produce plutonium in a form 
that could be put to weapons use37 prefers 
the adoption of fuel cycles that e.g. leave 
some contaminants (such as actinides or 
fission products) with the separated 
plutonium, though considers a once-through 
cycle (i.e. without reprocessing) as the best 
option. 
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6 HEALTH IMPACTS 
 
 
 
This section mainly deals with normal 
operation. Should it also deal with the likely 
disproportionate health consequences of 
untoward releases of radioactivity, the 
burden of future decommissioning closed 
down reactors and, in the longer term, any 
detriment arising out of this generation’s 
disposal of radioactive waste? – or is this too 
speculative? – or should more work be done 
on this? 
 
6.1 Potential health impacts of 
low effective dose exposures 
6.1.1 Cancers in general 
The current safety standards, for protecting 
the health of workers and the general public 
against the dangers arising from ionising 
radiations, are based on risk factors 
extrapolated to low dose and low dose rate 
situations. This is the so-called linear-no 
threshold (LNT) hypothesis. There are 
inherent limitations in obtaining empirical 
information on the health effects of radiation 
exposure at dose levels that are small 
fractions of natural background. 
 
Although doubts continue to be expressed 
about the LNT approach, the consensus is 
that the LNT model continues to provide an 
adequate basis (Rowney and Brindon, 
Amec/NCC). It is therefore adopted in the 
latest guidance documents from the ICRP38. 
This guidance document states that for the 
dose response factors at low doses and 
dose-rates for cancer and heritable effects, 
the ‘uncertainties are considerable but the 
balance of evidence weighs in favour of the 
use of a simple proportionate relationship 
between increments of dose and risk’. 
However, the hypothesis that there is a 
threshold dose, below which there are no 
health effects, cannot be ruled out (Rowney 
and Brindon, Amec/NCC).  
 
For individuals within identified critical 
groups, the nominal annual risk of 
developing a fatal cancer due to nuclear 
industry activities can be estimated, using 
the dose-risk factors recommended by the 
ICRP38,xii, as: 
 
Annual risk of cancer = dose received
per year x risk factor
 
Taking the estimated critical group annual 
doses for Hinkley Point C (0.006 mSv) and 
Louviisa (0.001 mSv) as, respectively, upper 
bound and typical values for a new-build 
PWR, the calculated annual individual risks of 
fatal cancer are 3.6 x 10-7 (approximately 1 
in 3 million) and 6 x 10-8 (approximately 1 in 
16 million). These risks are clearly extremely 
low. It should be noted that an involuntary 
annual risk of 1 x 10-6 (1 in one million) is 
deemed to be ‘broadly acceptable’ by the 
HSE39. 
 
6.1.2 Leukaemia 
Leukaemia is a rare disease and, apart from 
ionising radiation, little is known about its 
causes, although its existence pre-dates the 
nuclear age. UK guidance40 concludes that 
the risk factors currently calculated for 
radiation-induced leukaemia (fatal and non-
fatal) are around an order of magnitude 
lower than the risk factors for fatal cancers. 
Whilst raised levels of leukaemia in young 
people have been identified around some 
nuclear sites, studies of wider groupings 
have tended not to show increased 
population risks41. In the mid-1980s, 
evidence of a leukaemia cluster (additional 
material required here on the two Black 
reports) around the Sellafield reprocessing 
plant emerged with seven recorded cases in 
young people below 25 years of age 
between 1955 and 1985. A further cluster of 
xii These factors are currently under review, and 
the proposed values are slightly lower than those 
currently in use. It is conservative, therefore, to 
use the 1990 recommendations (0.060 Sv-1 for 
the population as a whole and 0.048 Sv-1 for the 
adult working population). 
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five reported cases emerged at Dounreay a 
year later. Following on from these local 
studies, multi-site studies were performed. 
The largest study so far concerned 4100 
cases in children, aged 0 to 14 years, around 
29 sites throughout England. Multi-site 
studies have also been performed in 
Scotland, USA, Canada, France, Germany, 
Japan, Sweden and Spain. The general 
conclusion from such studies is that the 
probability of leukaemia clusters is no higher 
near nuclear sites than elsewhere41. 
However, cluster studies tend to have 
inherent biases in both the analytical 
methodology and the interpretation of 
results, and their usefulness is questioned by 
some41.  
 
Case control studies have allowed specific 
hypotheses for causes of childhood 
leukaemia to be tested. The three main ones 
are: 
 
• environmental exposure to ionising 
radiations, 
• paternal pre-conception exposure, 
• infectious cause. 
 
Such studies have allowed some hypotheses 
to be rejected, but they do not provide an 
explanation for the clusters per se. 
Radiological assessments performed around 
Sellafield and Dounreay do not support a link 
with environmental exposure; however, in 
other case control studies around Cap de La 
Hague (the French nuclear fuel reprocessing 
plant), this hypothesis could not be ruled 
out41 and work is continuing internationally 
in this area. The paternal pre-conception 
hypothesis emerged from a UK case study42  
but several subsequent studies, attempting 
to validate this hypothesis, have effectively 
invalidated it41. The possibility of an 
infectious agent during the construction of 
large industrial facilities, combined with a 
high rate of population mixing in previously 
rural areas, was first proposed in the 
1990s43. However, no such agent has yet 
been found in any child with leukaemia. A 
more recent study in all Cumbria also 
supports the association between population 
mixing and leukaemia risk for ages below 15 
years, on the basis of geographical and 
individual data44. Generally, this hypothesis is 
gaining support but it has not yet been 
proved41. 
 
The 2005 report from the Committee on the 
Medical Aspects of Radiation in the 
Environment (COMARE)45 found no evidence 
for increased rates of childhood cancers 
within 25 km of NPP sites. There is no 
reason to believe that a programme of new-
build PWRs will change this situation. As 
discussed above, increased rates of 
leukaemia and non-Hodgkins lymphoma 
were confirmed around the Sellafield, 
Dounreay and Burghfield licensed sites (non-
reactor licensed nuclear sites). For other 
childhood cancers, raised incidence rates 
were found around Aldermaston, Burghfield, 
Harwell and possibly Rosyth, although the 
report 41suggests these findings may reflect 
generally raised rates of solid cancers in 
these areas. The next COMARE report will 
consider clustering of childhood cancer 
across the whole of Great Britain rather than 
specifically around licensed sites. 
 
6.2 Policy context 
The Radioactive Substances Strategy within 
the OSPAR Convention seeks progressive and 
substantial reductions of discharges, 
emissions and losses of radioactive 
substances with the ultimate (long-term) 
aim of achieving ‘close to zero’ 
concentrations of artificial radionuclides. In 
the medium term, the aim is to reduce 
discharges of radioactive substances such 
that additional concentrations in the marine 
environment above historic levels are ‘close 
to zero’ by the year 2020. 
 
As part of this strategy, national plans are 
expected to include ‘modifications of 
discharge authorisations, technical 
improvements to reduce discharges’. The UK 
environment agencies, in implementing this 
strategy, will seek to reduce UK discharge 
authorisations and, consequently, any 
potential environmental and human impacts 
of these discharges. 
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The UK government strategy, which applies 
only to liquid wastes, has as one of its aims 
the reduction of discharges such that 
‘[annual] critical group doses will be less 
than 0.02 mSv from liquid discharges to the 
marine environment, as a result of 
discharges made from 2020 onwards’. 
 
Many environmental groups, such as 
Greenpeace International, advocate an end 
to all radioactive discharges, based on a 
precautionary approach to environmental 
protection46 centred on: 
 
• damage prevention 
• decisions informed by scientific 
information 
• a progressive reduction of the presence 
of environmental stressors. 
 
Reference 46 argues that the effect of 
continued releases of radioactive material 
into the environment are unpredictable in 
the long term, that accumulations may be 
difficult to reverse and that any detrimental 
effects may be undetectable until it is too 
late to reduce their overall impact. Inherent 
in the objective of ceasing all releases of 
radioactive materials is the presumption that 
all such releases are potentially detrimental. 
 
6.3 Regulatory framework 
There is a strict legal framework for 
radiological protection of both employees in 
the nuclear industry and the wider 
population. The fundamental tenets, in 
Europe, are laid out in47, under the Euratom 
treaty. This is implemented in the UK by the 
Ionising Radiations Regulations 199948. 
 
Under UK law, all employers are responsible 
for ensuring the safety of employees and the 
public under the Health and Safety at Work 
Act. Further provisions apply to nuclear sites, 
as outlined in section 3. Nuclear site licences 
contain 36 conditions which set out the 
safety requirements to ensure the risks on a 
nuclear site are properly managed. Breach of 
these Site Licence Conditions is an offence 
under the Nuclear Installations Act. 
 
The HSE is responsible for regulating nuclear 
safety, including the safe management, 
storage and conditioning of nuclear wastes 
on licensed sites. However, the UK 
environment agencies (the Environment 
Agency (EA) in England and Wales, and the 
Scottish Environment Protection Agency 
(SEPA) in Scotland), are responsible for 
regulating discharges of radioactivity into the 
environment from licensed sites. The 
discharge of radioactive wastes in the UK are 
regulated by the Radioactive Substances Act 
1993 and the Environment Act 1995. There is 
a further range of legislation that also 
applies, including the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990 and the Pollution 
Prevention and Control Regulations 2000.  
The memorandum of understanding49 
between the HSE and the EA to co-ordinate 
these regulatory roles states that: 
‘The goals of both HSE and EA are, together: 
 
• To deliver effective and efficient 
regulation of the nuclear industry in 
England and Wales 
• To maintain and improve standards of 
protection of people and the 
environment from the potential hazards 
from ionising radiations, and  
• to ensure that radioactive wastes are 
appropriately managed in both the short 
and long term , in accordance with 
legislation, UK Government policy and 
international obligations.’ 
 
Similar working arrangements are in place in 
Scotland50. 
 
In addition, the UK has signed up to two 
conventions, the North Sea Conference and 
the Oslo-Paris (OSPAR) Convention, whose 
objective is to reduce the load of 
contaminants discharged to the North Sea, 
including all UK coastal waters. Additional 
legislation is in place to cover emergency 
preparedness and decommissioning of 
existing facilities, but this is outside the 
scope of the current study. 
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6.4 Worker doses 
6.4.1 Collective radiation exposure 
Industry groups like the World Association of 
Nuclear Operators (WANO) exist with the 
aim of improving safety at civil nuclear 
power plants (NPPs) around the world - 
although some commentators regard this as 
industry PR. Part of this process is the plant 
performance indicator programme. Data on 
performance indicators has been collected 
and published by WANO since 1991. Among 
the indicators considered is collective 
radiation exposure (CRE) for the workforce. 
This monitors the effectiveness of worker 
radiation protection across the current civil 
reactor types. CRE information between 
1990 and 2004 is summarised in Table 4 for 
the three most common reactor types, PWR, 
BWR and Gas-Cooled Reactor (GCR). It can be 
seen that, with occasional exceptions, CRE 
has consistently reduced over time.  
A more detailed breakdown of CRE data for 
European PWRs over the period 2000 to 
2004, taken from 51 and 52, is summarised in 
Table 5. It can be seen that, over this period, 
the UK CRE is consistently among the lowest 
in Europe. 
 
6.4.2 Individual radiation exposure 
Individual radiation exposure in the nuclear 
industry is controlled by the implementation 
of strict health physics procedures. The 
average occupational dose received by 
workers in the UK nuclear industry is around 
1 mSv per year. – need to clarify and 
reference – not clear which workers are 
being referred to:   Ionising radiation 
regulations Classified or are Written Scheme 
workers included, or could it include all 
workers at the plant? This is contrasted with 
other occupational doses in Table 6, where is 
seen that this is around half the average 
annual dose received by air crew and 
substantially less than the dose received by 
workers in radon-prone areas. 
 
Within any group average dose, there are 
individuals who receive higher and lower 
doses than the average. The Nuclear Energy 
Agency of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development collates 
occupational exposure data for the nuclear 
industry. In France, which operates 59 PWRs, 
generating 78 % of total electricity supply, 
the average individual dose of all exposed 
workers (Électricité de France - EdF - and 
contractors) for 2002-3 was about 1.9 mSv53. 
From October 2001 to September 2003, no 
one received an annual dose in excess of 20 
mSvxiii - although we should also discuss the 
‘three-tenths’ investigative level of 6mSv at 
which no further exposure is permitted 
unless justified. In September 2003, due to 
an incident at Bugey unit 2, a worker 
received 17 mSv in the month, bringing his 
accumulated dose over 12 rolling months to 
24.5 mSv. At the end of 2003, 53 workers, 
working in specialist areas that resulted in 
high exposure, received doses over 16 mSv 
on 12 rolling months. Naturally, there would 
have been many workers with doses below 
the 1.9 mSv average during the same 
period. 
 
Corresponding information for the UK’s 
Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) and 
PWR stations can be found in the British 
Energy Safety, Health and Environment 
report series. For example, in 2001 no 
worker exceeded the company’s internal 
annual dose limit of 10 mSv, and more than 
97% of the workforce received doses below 
2.24 mSv54. In 2003, the highest individual 
dose on a British Energy site was 9.14 mSv 
(for contractor’s staff), with 5.31 mSv being 
the highest dose to a British Energy 
employee55. 
 
xiii The International Commission for Radiological 
Protection (ICRP) individual dose limit for 
radiation workers is 100mSv, averaged over five 
years. This is normally treated as an annual limit 
of 20mSv, as for instance in Ref 1, Principle 11, to 
ensure that the five-year limit is not exceeded. 
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6.5 Doses to members of the 
public 
6.5.1 Radioactivity in the environment: 
Marina II study in the OSPAR 
region 
The European Commission has funded major 
research programmes to provide information 
on radiological conditions in the North East 
Atlantic (OSPAR region). The latest review56 
shows that, by the end of the 1990s, inputs 
of radioactivity from all sources (excluding 
the Chernobyl accident in 1986) had 
decreased by several orders of magnitude 
since peaking in the 1960s and 1970s. This 
has resulted in reductions in radionuclide 
concentrations in the marine environment, 
individual doses to critical groups and 
collective doses to European populations. 
Since the mid-1980s, the main contribution 
to discharges of beta activity into the OSPAR 
region has been from nuclear reprocessing 
plants (Sellafield and Cap de la Hague). 
either clarify (e.g. discuss significance of 
alpha, beta and gamma radiation) – or 
delete 
 
The study also found that nuclear industry 
discharges were still dominated by the 
reprocessing of nuclear fuel. In terms of 
contributing to collective dose, discharges 
from nuclear power generation, fuel 
fabrication and research reactors were small 
(2%) compared with discharges from nuclear 
fuel reprocessing (10%). Hence, the effect 
on collective population dose from a new 
nuclear power station will be very low, 
especially if spent fuel is not reprocessedxiv.
Assessment of doses to the UK population 
The National Radiological Protection Board 
(now part of the Health Protection Agency) 
has assessed the annual average dose to a 
member of the UK population from all 
sources of radioactivity (natural and man-
                                                
xiv Assuming that the contribution to collective 
dose due to reprocessing remains unchanged. In 
practice, as older plant is retired and efforts to 
reduce discharges continue, there may be a 
reduction in this area also. 
made) as 2.6 mSvxv. The breakdown from 
the various sources is shown in Table 7, 
where it can be seen that over 80% of this is 
due to natural radioactivity. The natural 
background activity varies across the 
country, and is higher in areas where there 
is radon in the ground or where there are 
significant amounts of granite. The largest 
contribution from man-made radionuclides, 
at 0.37 mSv (14%), is due to medical 
exposures. This dose is equivalent to around 
20 single film chest X-rays, although some 
individuals can receive doses a few hundred 
times higher than this and many individuals 
will receive no dose at all. 
 
The latest available results (2003) of 
monitoring of man-made radionuclides in 
food and the environment by the 
Environment Agencies throughout the United 
Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of 
Man are presented in RIFE-957, xvi. The primary 
purposes of the monitoring programmes are 
‘to provide an independent check on the 
effects of discharges of radioactive materials 
in the United Kingdom’, and ‘to ensure that 
any radioactivity present in food and the 
environment due to discharges does not 
compromise environmental or public health’. 
The environmental surveys are conducted 
independently of the industries that 
discharge wastes to the environment57. 
 
The dose estimates presented in 57 are likely 
to be overestimates due to the conservative 
approach taken. The monitoring programme 
results show that even the most exposed 
members of the UK public received effective 
doses from all man-made sources (through 
the consumption of food and exposure to 
environmental radioactivity) below the 
xv This is calculated as the total assessed dose to 
the UK population divided by the population of 
the UK. Inevitably there will be variations on this 
figure, as discussed in the main text. 
xvi RIFE-10 was published as this report was being 
prepared. The Foreword to RIFE-10 states that ‘in 
2004, there were no major changes in levels of 
radioactivity in food or environmental materails 
compared to those in our report for 2003’. 
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statutory annual dose limit of 1 mSvxvii. The 
most exposed individuals, at 0.62 mSv per 
year, were people in Cumbria that are 
assumed to consume large quantities of 
locally-caught fish and shellfish. This dose is 
predominantly due to legacy d scha ges 
(discharges that have occurred in the past, 
and are now very much lower or have 
ceased altogether). Of these, 67% were 
contributed by enhanced natural 
radionuclides, as a by-product of the 
phosphate industry in Whitehaven, and 33% 
came from discharges of man-made 
radionuclides from the Sellafield 
reprocessing site.  
 
Analyses of food and drinking water in the 
general U.K. diet, in areas remote from 
nuclear sites, were also reported in57. The 
estimated annual exposure for a one year 
old child, as a result of consumption at 
average rates, is 0.33 mSv, as summarised in 
Table 8. In all cases the estimated exposures 
of infants were higher than older age 
groups. The results show that radioactivity 
from natural sources was by far the most 
significant source of exposure, with man-
made radionuclides contributing only 0.023 
mSv (7%). Of these, the dominant 
radionuclide detected was strontium-90, 
derived from weapons test fall-out, and the 
remaining man-made radionuclides only 
contributed around 0.003 mSv (1%). There 
was some evidence for the effects of 
radioactive waste disposal into the 
environment (via discharge of liquids or 
gases) reaching the general diet, in the form 
of positively detected amounts of sulphur-35 
and tritium. However, for many man-made 
radionuclides, the results were close to the 
detection thresholds for the analytical 
methods in use. 
 
                                                
xvii The statutory annual dose limit only applies to 
doses received by the public as a result of 
practices controlled under48, such as the 
operation of nuclear plants. Higher limits apply to 
classified workers working with ionising 
radiation. These limits do not apply to patients 
receiving medical exposure, their comforters or 
carers. 
6.5.2 Estimated dose uptake from 
operational discharges (current 
UK nuclear power stations) 
The annual critical groupxviii doses estimated 
from radioactivity measured in food and the 
environment around current UK NPP sites are 
summarised in Table 9, taken from 57. These 
dose assessments estimate the combined 
impact of all discharges of radioactivity, both 
local and remote, current and historic. 
However, the implication is that the dose 
estimates are mostly due to discharges from 
the local site. Several UK NPP sites have 
more than one reactor design, generally 
both Magnox and AGR although Heysham 
has two different designs of AGR and 
Sizewell has two Magnox reactors and one 
PWR. Some of the reactors are in the early 
phase of decommissioning. 
 
The highest dose, at 0.075 mSv, is to 
seafood consumers at Heysham in 
Lancashire. However, it is stated that this 
dose is predominantly due to legacy 
discharges of liquids from the Sellafield site. 
The second highest critical group dose, at 
0.057 mSv, is at the Sizewell site in Suffolk. 
Analysis of seafood, sediment, sand, 
seawater, freshwater, milk crops and fruit 
near the site generally showed low levels of 
man-made radionuclides, resulting in critical 
group doses  below 0.005 mSv. However, a 
further dose contribution is added from 
radionuclide concentrations in air.  
 
For some sites, in particular the steel 
pressure vessel Magnox stations, discharges 
of argon-41 to air are significant whilst the 
reactors are generating electricity. Argon-41 
is a noble gas with a short radioactive half-
life (1.8 hours) and does not become 
incorporated into food produce; however,  
people living or working nearby may be 
exposed to external radiation as it disperses 
downwind from the discharge point (given 
the half life, the exposure could be for 
around 12 hours). An allowance for this 
xviii The critical group in any locality are those 
persons whose lifestyle leads (or is assumed to 
lead) to the highest radiation exposure in that 
area. 
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contribution was included in the 
assessments performed in 57 for Oldburyxix, 
Dungeness A and Sizewell A. These stations 
will cease electricity generation between 
2006 and 2008. 
 
Excluding the argon-41 discharges and the 
Heysham results (which, it could be argued, 
have been inflated by Sellafield discharges), 
the highest critical group doses are in the 
range <0.005 to 0.03 mSv, and are typically 
to seafood consumers. For those individuals 
in the critical group, this adds around 1% of 
the UK average individual annual dose. 
As previously stated, there is some evidence 
for the effects of waste disposal into the 
environment (via discharge of liquids or 
gases) reaching the general diet in the form 
of sulphur-35 and tritium. Man-made 
radionuclides from all sources, excluding 
strontium-90 (derived from nuclear weapons 
testing and therefore not relevant to this 
review), contribute around 0.003 mSv, and 
add around 0.1% to the UK average 
individual annual dose.  
 
6.5.3 Prospective dose uptake from 
new build 
As stated in section 5.2, the UK strategy on 
radioactive substances has, as one of its 
aims, the reduction of discharges such that 
‘critical group doses will be less than 0.02 
mSv from liquid discharges to the marine 
environment, as a result of discharges made 
from 2020 onwards’. Hence, if new stations 
were constructed to replace the electricity 
generation capacity lost by the Magnox and 
AGR closure programme, there would be a 
reduction in overall discharges compared to 
recent years. It is expected that the 
discharge authorisations granted to any 
potential new build plant would be no 
higher than those currently in force for the 
most recently constructed reactor, the PWR 
at Sizewell.  
 
xix Oldbury seems to have been included in this 
list in error: it has reinforced concrete pressure 
vessels, as does Wylfa, the last of the Magnox 
stations. 
The latest available site specific analysis was 
performed for the UK PWR build programme, 
based on the Sizewell ‘B’ design, in support 
of the Hinkley Point C public enquiry58. The 
results, summarised in Table 10, show that 
the highest critical group dose of 0.006 
mSv/y was predicted to be due to liquid 
discharges. This level of dose is comparable 
to the best of the current operating fleet. 
 
As stated in section 1.1, it is likely that any 
new reactor build programme would be 
based on a standardised advanced PWR 
design, as represented by the Westinghouse 
AP1000 design and the Areva/Framatome 
EPR design. These concepts have been 
developed to be licensable in many 
countries around the world without 
modification to the basic design, and the 
first EPR is currently being built in Finland.  
 
Quantities of radionuclides discharged to the 
environment during periods of normal 
operation will depend on the way the plant 
is operated as well as on the design.  
European guidance on performing dose 
assessments for planned discharges of 
radioactivity is available, e.g. 59. Such 
assessments would be performed to support 
any planning application for NPP 
construction, as part of the environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) process. EIAs in 
support of new NPP construction in Europe 
have been performed in Finland for sites at 
Loviisa60 and Olkiluoto. The estimated critical 
group exposure at Loviisa 60 was 
0.001 mSv/y. 
 
In terms of contributing to public exposure, 
discharges directly attributable to electricity 
generation are small, compared to those 
from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. 
Although there has also been a reducing 
trend in these discharges in recent decades, 
there are still legacy issues in this area 
causing public concern. Current expectations 
are that spent fuel from any potential new 
stations would be stored on site for some 
time, potentially up to the whole operating 
lifetime of the station, before a final disposal 
option is selected. Therefore, in terms of 
public perception in the longer term, the 
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decision to reprocess fuel, or dispose of it 
directly, is a significant one. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
7.1 Conclusion on accident risk 
Nuclear power stations in the UK have to be 
designed to stringent standards which 
ensure that all reasonably practicable steps 
are taken to avoid accidents, and to mitigate 
the on- and off-site consequences of any 
accidents that might take place. UK civil 
nuclear power stations have an excellent 
safety record, with no events reported above 
INES level 2  (no off-site consequences, 
enough defence-in-depth to cope with 
additional failures). However, the 1957 
Windscale fire, at a military reactor was at 
least Level 5 INES, with off-site 
environmental impacts. 
 
Modern reactor designs incorporate safety 
features that reduce the already small 
accident risks to very low levels. 
 
7.2 Conclusion on security issues 
There are high levels of security at nuclear 
power stations, and the provisions are 
regularly reviewed against a Design Basis 
Threat which is based on current intelligence 
about terror groups, their intentions and 
capabilities. Stringent personnel vetting 
procedures are in place to minimise the 
possibility of infiltration by undesirable 
individuals. 
 
PWRs have substantial containment 
buildings which, on the basis of post 9-11 
studies, are unlikely to be breached even by 
a crashing airliner – although none has been 
designed with this in mind, and the results 
might differ if for example specific strikes on 
a structure including response to hard 
missiles from the aircraft rather than the 
overall impact of the crashing airliner were 
considered. Within the buildings, the fuel is 
protected against impact and fire by other 
structures. The defence-in-depth principle 
means that several layers of protection 
would have to be disabled to cause an 
uncontrolled release of activity, with the 
probability that the reactor would be shut 
down once a fault was detected. However, it 
remains difficult to fully account for future 
changes in the modus operandi of terrorist 
groups and their capacity to exploit 
weaknesses in the design, operation or 
security of nuclear power stations and 
associated infrastructure. 
 
If it is decided to reprocess spent fuel, it will 
be shipped from the station in heavy, 
shielded containers that are resistant to 
attack and theft, although the containers 
themselves could be regarded as a potential 
‘dirty-bomb’. The industry argues that the 
pellets themselves are not easily dispersed 
even under severe impacting and fire, thus 
negating any attempt to achieve widespread 
contamination – but others argue that they 
could be used in crude reactor-grade 
devices, Sandia argues that they could be 
dispersed, and IAEA do not consider MOX to 
be LDM. Although the fuel would be difficult 
to convert into weapons-grade material, a 
crude nuclear device can be made with 
reactor-grade material, and the possibility of 
being exposed to life-threatening doses of 
radiation might not deter fanatics.  
 
The industry view is that although the 
possibility of a terrorist attack on a nuclear 
power station cannot be ruled out, nor the 
ensuing publicity even if the attack failed, it 
is unlikely that widespread public harm 
could result. Others disagree on almost every 
count. 
 
7.3 Conclusion on nuclear 
proliferation 
The UK is bound by the NPT and the Euratom 
Treaty, which include measures to prevent 
the spread of nuclear weapons, and has 
made specific agreements not to divert 
civilian nuclear materials to military use. 
Under these agreements, Euratom and the 
IAEA apply safeguards to verify that no 
diversion has taken place. Over the years, 
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there has been no transfer of civilian nuclear 
material to weapons production, which 
would breach the UK’s treaty obligations. 
 
Nevertheless, a number of difficulties in the 
relationship between civil and military 
applications continue to cause concern 
among many commentators61, including: 
 
• the difficulties of enforcing international 
treaty obligations; 
• proliferation risks associated with the 
widespread use of nuclear technologies 
in countries with very diverse systems 
of governance; 
• the resources available to enforce 
international obligations in a potentially 
growing number of states with a 
nuclear capacity; and, 
• how to deal with states that withdraw 
from treaties (e.g. North Korea) or 
develop nuclear capability outside of 
them, such as India, Pakistan and Israel, 
and the suspected development of a 
nuclear military capability in Iran.  
 
All of these lead to a general concern about 
making clear distinctions between civil and 
military uses of nuclear power especially 
where reprocessing is used. 
 
Safeguards will be applied to any new-build 
nuclear power station as a matter of course -
although there are concerns about the 
measurability of the stocks of plutonium and 
highly enriched uranium in a commercial 
setting dealing with large volumes of these 
materials.  
 
 
7.4 Conclusion on health impacts 
Radiological protection of both nuclear 
industry employees and the population in 
general is covered by a strict legal 
framework. Statutory dose limits to both 
groups are a small fraction of naturally 
occurring levels. 
 
Doses due to the nuclear industry are 
dominated by spent fuel reprocessing, while 
those from nuclear power stations mostly 
originate from older designs which will soon 
be retired. Dose levels from modern PWRs 
are very low, and are expected to reduce 
still further for new-build stations. The 
calculated risks of a member of the public 
developing a fatal cancer, due to a new-
build NPP, are correspondingly small and 
considered ‘broadly acceptable’ by the HSE. 
 
There is no evidence of increased rates of 
childhood cancers, including leukaemia, 
around any nuclear power station site. It is 
not expected that this will change with a 
programme of new-build stations. 
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8 GLOSSARY 
 
 
AGR Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
ASN Autorité de sûreté nucléaire [Nuclear Safety Authority] 
BSL Basic Safety Limit 
BSO Basic Safety Objective 
BWR Boiling Water Reactor 
CCTV Closed Circuit Television 
COMARE Committee on the Medical Aspects of Radiation in the Environment 
CRE Collective Radiation Exposure 
DBA Design Basis Accident 
EA Environment Agency 
EdF Électricité de France 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
EPR European Pressurised [water] Reactor 
EPRI Electricity Power Research Institute 
EU European Union 
GCR Gas-Cooled Reactor 
HSE Health and Safety Executive 
HSW Health and Safety at Work [Act] 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICRP International Commission for Radiological Protection 
INES International Nuclear Event Scale 
LNT Linear no-threshold [hypothesis] 
LWR Light Water Reactor (i.e. BWR or PWR) 
MOX mixed oxide (i.e. uranium dioxide and plutonium dioxide) 
MUF Materials Unaccounted For 
NII Nuclear Installations Inspectorate 
NPP Nuclear Power Plant 
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
NNWS Non-nuclear Weapons State 
NSC Nuclear Safety Committee 
NWS Nuclear Weapons State 
OCNS Office for Civil Nuclear Security 
OSPAR Oslo-Paris [Convention] 
PORV Pilot-operated relief valve 
PWR Pressurised Water Reactor 
RBMK Reactor Bolshoy Moshchnosty Kanalny (high-power channel reactor) 
SAP Safety Assessment Principle 
SDC Sustainable Development Commission 
SEPA Scottish Environment Protection Agency 
SLC Site Licence Condition 
UK United Kingdom 
UNGG Uranium naturel graphite-gaz (natural uranium/graphite/gas) (similar to Magnox) 
USA United States of America 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators 
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9 TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1: The international nuclear event scale 
Event type INES level Description 
Deviation 0 Event with no safety significance 
1 Anomaly 
On- and off-site impact: nil 
Defence-in-depth degradation: beyond the authorised 
operating regime 
2 Incident 
Off-site impact: nil 
On-site impact: significant spread of contamination, 
or over-exposure of worker 
Defence-in-depth degradation: significant failures in 
safety provisions 
Incident 
3 Serious incident 
Off-site impact: very small release - public exposure 
at a fraction of prescribed limits 
On-site impact: Major contamination, or acute health 
effects to a worker 
Defence-in-depth degradation: near-accident - no 
safety layers remaining 
4 Accident without significant off-site risk 
Off-site impact: minor release - public exposure of 
the order of prescribed limits 
On-site impact: significant damage to reactor core or 
radiological barriers, or worker fatality 
5 Accident with off site risk -
Off-site impact: limited release - partial 
implementation of local emergency plans 
On-site impact: severe damage to reactor core or 
radiological barriers 
6 Serious accident 
Off-site impact: significant release - full 
implementation of local emergency plans 
Accident 
7 Major accident 
Off site impact: major release, widespread health and 
environmental effects 
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Table 2: Examples of events rated INES 3 and above 
Level Date Place Characteristics 
7 1986 Chernobyl, USSR (power 
station) 
Widespread environmental and human health 
consequences 
6 1957 Kyshtym, USSR 
(reprocessing plant) 
Large off-site release and evacuation of local 
population 
5 1957 Windscale (military 
reactor) 
Off-site release and restrictions on consuming food 
produced locally 
5 1979 Three Mile Island, USA 
(power station) 
Severe core damage and reactor written off (very 
limited off-site releases) 
4 1973 Windscale (reprocessing 
plant) 
Release of radioactive material into a plant 
operating area 
4 1977 Bohunice A1, 
Czechoslovakia (power 
station) 
Accident during fuel loading resulted in corrosion 
damage to fuel and activity release into plant area. 
Reactor shut down and decommissioned. 
4 1980 Saint-Laurent, France 
(power station) 
Partial damage to reactor core: no off-site release 
(reactor repaired and operated until 1992) 
4 1983 Buenos Aires, Argentina 
(research reactor) 
Power excursion due to not observing safety rules 
while modifying core: caused death of operator 
4 1999 Tokai Mura, Japan 
(reprocessing plant) 
Criticality event resulting in two deaths: violation of 
safety procedures, lax safety management 
3 1989 Vandellos, Spain (power 
station) 
Turbine fire degraded plant’s safety systems. No 
core damage or off-site release 
3 2005 Sellafield (reprocessing 
plant) 
Leakage of highly active liquid into secondary 
containment: undetected for several months 
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Table 3: INES level 0 to 3 incidents in the UK since 1996 
Key: DEC Facility being decommissioned 
NPS Nuclear power station 
  REP Reprocessing plant 
  RES Research facility 
 
Date Location Facility INES 
level 
Brief details 
27/8/96 Sellafield REP 2 Process worker contaminated due to protective 
clothing being damaged - dose above statutory 
limits 
11/11/96 Hartlepool NPS 1 Unexpected movement of cold reheat pipework 
due to condensate build-up 
--/2/97 Sellafield REP 2 Activity-in-air levels increased due to dust being 
disturbed (collision of shielded container with 
girder) - doses well within statutory limits 
--/2/97 Sellafield REP 2 Leak from steam supply allowed radioactive 
liquor to drip onto roof - then washed into surface 
water drains and road surfaces by rain. No 
significant doses. 
3/3/97 Hunterston B NPS 0 Reactor gas delivered to clean CO2 storage tanks 
with potential to contaminate road tankers 
--/3/97 Hartlepool NPS 0 Sub-surface defect detected during ultrasonic 
inspection of superheater header 
16/4/97 Trawsfynydd 
(similar event 
at Berkeley) 
DEC 0 Surface dose rates on container for Drigg higher 
than stated on despatch note and slghtly above 
permitted level 
--/6/97 Chapelcross NPS 0 Defect identified in heat exchanger bracket 
2/10/97 Hartlepool / 
Heysham 1 
NPS 1 Difficulty in determining defect sizes for reactor 
standpipes from historical records of non-
destructive examinations 
1/11/97 Windscale 
(UKAEA) 
RES 0 Fire occurred during removal of old Magnox fuel 
element from container - no release of activity 
9/11/97 Sellafield REP 1 Release of ruthenium-106 from waste vitrification 
plant 
23/1/98 Sellafield REP 1 Leak of contaminated nitric acid into operating 
area - no external release 
--/3/98 Dungeness B 
Hartlepool 
Heysham 1/2 
Hinkley Pt B 
Hunterston B 
NPS 1 Incorrectly-set safety relief valves 
15/4/98 Hartlepool NPS 1 Small leak from weld in reheat pipework 
21/4/98 Sizewell B NPS 2 Wiring error during modification - redundancy 
provisions reduced but plant would have operated 
correctly on demand 
--/--/98 Sellafield REP 1 Leakage of contaminated water through a 
defective seal - original drain point blocked 
8/7/98 Sizewell A NPS 0 Cracking of guide tube assembly welds found to 
be greater than allowed in Safety Case 
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3/8/98 Sellafield REP 0 Release of alpha activity from glovebox in MOX 
demonstration plant - confined to building 
17/11/98 Bradwell NPS 1 Failure of all electrical supplies to Reactor 2 
essential supplies board and of some supplies to 
station emergency board - Operating Rule 
contravened 
27/12/98 Hunterston B NPS 2 Loss of grid connection due to bad weather 
leading to double reactor trip - automatic 
protection systems not reset and subsequent 
supply problems after second loss of grid. Fault on 
one back-up generator caused problems in 
maintaining cooling to one reactor. Reactor 
conditions remained stable throughout incident. 
9/10/00 Sellafield REP 1 Loss of electrical supplies to large part of plant 
due to defective component in new 11 kV 
switchgear - power restored within Safety Case 
time limit 
--/--/01 Hunterston B NPS 1 Radioactivity discovered in ground water 
6/3/01 Sellafield REP 1 Release of plutonium contamination while 
changing gloves on glovebox - contained within 
facility 
--/--/01 Chapelcross NPS 1 Irradiated fuel element failed to release from 
grab and was lifted out of shielding 
5/7/01 Chapelcross NPS 1 Basket containing irradiated fuel elements 
dropped during routine operations - 12 elements 
fell into discharge shaft and remainder were 
contained within discharge machine. 
6/7/01 Sellafield DEC 1 Localised flooding during rain storm released 
historic plutonium contamination in laboratory 
being decommissioned 
--/9/01 Heysham 1 NPS 1 Discovery of cracked core bricks during periodic 
shutdown 
--/--/01 Sellafield REP 0 Discovery of Technetium-99 in borehole 
11/3/02 Heysham 1 NPS 2 Failure of short shield plug to disconnect from 
fuelling machine - plug severed when fuelling 
machine moved. Lower part fell into storage tube 
- could have been more serious if operations had 
occurred over a reactor 
12/11/02 Dounreay DEC 0 Leakage of contaminated zinc bromide into 
working area - 18 workers received 
contamination to shoes and/or hands and face. 
No release to environment 
20/4/05 Sellafield REP 3 Leak of active liquor from THORP pipework into 
shielded containment sump - no loss to 
environment. No leak detection equipment fitted 
and pipe may have been leaking for several 
months. 
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Table 4: Summary of the CRE performance indicator (WANO data) ,  
CRE (man-Sv/y) per unit No. of units  
PWR BWR GCR PWR BWR GCR 
1990 1.74 2.76 0.57 218 81 37 
1992 1.66 2.66 0.21 227 83 35 
1994 1.27 2.56 0.23 234 88 35 
1996 1.16 2.24 0.19 246 92 35 
1998 0.93 1.75 0.20 247 91 34 
2000 0.85 1.26 0.10 250 90 32 
2002 0.78 1.23 0.15 255 90 16 
2004 0.61 1.22 0.03 259 91 22 
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Table 5: Average CRE for PWRs by country, 2000-200451,52 
Average collective dose per reactor (man-Sv/y)  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
0.35 
1.09 
1.13 
0.56 
- 
0.59 
0.43 
0.69 
0.46 
0.54 
1.02 
0.89 
0.52 
- 
0.43 
0.35 
0.48 
0.19 
0.42 
0.97 
1.23 
0.34 
0.58 
0.49 
0.51 
0.51 
0.30 
0.38 
0.89 
1.04 
0.26 
0.80 
0.43 
0.54 
0.34 
0.35 
0.39 
0.79 
0.90 
0.79 
0.69 
0.30 
0.58 
0.48 
0.03 
All countries 0.91 0.87 0.88 0.80 0.71 
 
 
 
Table 6: Average occupational doses across UK industries (from NPRB ‘At-a-glance’ leaflet Maps
and Magnitudes) 
 
Occupational group Average annual dose (mSv) 
Medical, dental and veterinary 0.1 
Industrial radiography 0.8 
Nuclear industry 1.0 
Air crew 2.0 
Workers in radon-prone areas 5.3 
 
 
 
Table 7: Breakdown of annual average dose to the UK population (from NPRB ‘At-a-glance’ leaflet 
Maps and Magnitudes) 
Source Average dose 
(mSv) 
Radon gas 1.3 
Food and drink 0.3 
Gamma rays (construction materials, etc) 0.35 
Cosmic radiation 0.26 
Medical 0.37 
Work 0.007 
Fall-out 0.005 
Radioactive discharges 0.0004 
Consumer products 0.0004 
Total 2.6 
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Table 8: Estimates of radiation exposure to a one year old child from radionuclides in the diet57 
Nuclide Exposure (mSv) 
to a 1 year old 
child 
Notes 
Man-made radionuclides 
Tritium
Sulphur-35 
Strontium-90
Caesium-137 
Plutonium-238 
Plutonium (239 + 240) 
Americium-241 
0.0001 
0.0004 
0.02 
0.0002 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.0003 
Also produced by natural means 
 
Derived from weapons test fall-out 
Sub-total 0.023  
Natural radionuclides (excluding Potassium-40) 
Carbon-14
Lead-210 
Polonium-210 
Radium-226 
Uranium 
Thorium-232 
0.01 
0.04 
0.08 
0.008 
0.001 
0.0004 
Also produced by man 
Sub-total 0.14  
Potassium-40 0.17 Levels of potassium in the body are 
homeostatically controlledxx and so 
exposures do not vary according to 
the potassium-40 content of food. 
The average annual dose from 
potassium-40 in the general diet is 
0.17 mSv. 
Total 0.333  
 
                                                
xx This means that the body itself controls the potassium level to an ideal value. An example of homeostatic 
control is the regulation of body temperature at around 37°C, using  mechanisms such as sweating or 
shivering to correct any imbalance. 
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Table 9: Estimated individual radiation exposures to critical groups around nuclear power station 
sites (2003 data) 
Site Exposed group Total 
Exposure 
(mSv/y) 
Seafood consumers adult 0.007 Berkeley (shutdown) 
and Oldbury Inhabitants and consumers of 
locally grown food 
1Yr old child 0.005 
Seafood consumers adult 0.013 Bradwell (shutdown) 
Consumers of locally grown food 1Yr old child <0.005 
Seafood consumers adult 0.037 Chapelcross 
(shutdown 2004) Inhabitants and consumers of 
locally grown food 
1Yr old child 0.020 
Seafood consumers adult 0.007 Dungeness ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
Inhabitants and consumers of 
locally grown food 
1Yr old child 0.11 
Seafood consumers adult <0.005 Hartlepool 
Consumers of locally grown food 1Yr old child <0.005 
Seafood consumers adult 0.075 Heysham 1 and 2 
Consumers of locally grown food 1Yr old child 0.006 
Seafood consumers adult 0.013 Hinkley Point ‘A’ 
(shutdown) and ‘B’ Consumers of locally grown food 1Yr old child <0.005 
Seafood consumers adult <0.005 
Beach occupants adult 0.007 
Hunterston ‘A’ 
(shutdown) and ‘B’ 
Consumers of locally grown food 1Yr old child 0.014 
Seafood consumers adult <0.005 Sizewell ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
Inhabitants and consumers of 
locally grown food 
1Yr old child 0.057 
Seafood consumers adult 0.005 Torness 
Consumers of locally grown food 1Yr old child 0.019 
Anglers adult 0.032 Trawsfynydd 
(shutdown) Consumers of locally grown food 1Yr old child 0.006 
Seafood consumers adult 0.012 Wylfa 
Consumers of locally grown food 1Yr old child <0.005 
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Table 10: Annual predicted radiological impact of a proposed PWR station (Hinkley Point C) 
 Dose  Radionuclides contributing 5 
% or more 
Effective dose to the critical 
group (adult) from liquid 
discharges 
0.006 mSv / y Cobalt-58 / 60 
Caesium-134 / 137 
Carbon-14 
Iodine-131 
Silver-110m 
Effective dose to the critical 
group (1 yr old child) from 
atmospheric discharges 
0.0009 mSv / y Carbon-14 
Xenon-133 
Collective dose to the 
population of Great Britain 
due to normal operation 
0.08 man Sv / y Carbon-14 
Cobalt-60 
Cobalt-58 
 
Figure 1: Comparative size of targets (World Trade Center, Pentagon and typical PWR 
containment) 
 
 
 
 
Safety and security www.sd-commission.org.uk 
 
46 
 
 
Figure 2: Typical water reactor, showing multiple layers of safety 
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10 APPENDIX A - SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR NUCLEAR 
ACCIDENTS 
 
 
 
Should we also discuss other nuclear 
accidents including: NRX, SL-1, FERMI 1, 
Lucens. Also in the UK the channel fire at 
Chapelcross (1960s) is of interest and, more 
recently, the difficulties experienced by HMS 
Tireless at Gibraltar provide an insight into 
the British nuclear safety culture. 
 
10.1 Chernobyl (INES 7) 
(from 62, adapted) 
The accident at Chernobyl Reactor 4 took 
place shortly after midnight on 26 April 
1986. It was intended to carry out an 
experiment to determine whether, if the 
reactor was shut down, the turbine would 
generate enough electrical power (while it 
was running down) to keep the coolant 
pumps running before the emergency diesel 
generator came on line. Since the reactor 
was due to be shut down for routine 
maintenance, the test was planned to 
coincide with the shutdown. To prevent the 
test from being interrupted, various safety 
systems were deliberately switched off 
(including the emergency core cooling 
system), and the reactor power was to be 
reduced to 25% of normal. The reactor 
design is unstable below about 22% power, 
and the operating computer could be 
programmed to maintain the reactor above 
this level. The operators appear not to have 
done so. 
 
The shutdown started around 0100 the 
previous day, and by 1400 the reactor had 
reached 50% power. Because of grid 
demand, further power reductions were not 
permitted but, because the shutdown was 
already in progress, the core was 
progressively being poisoned by xenon, 
which is a strong neutron absorberxxi. To 
xxi More technical details can be found by 
consulting the references by Edwards and Kress, 
quoted in 62. 
compensate for this, control rods were 
progressively withdrawn, leaving only 6-8 in 
the core rather than the minimum 30. 
Several automatic reactor trip circuits also 
had to be disabled, to prevent the reactor 
from automatically shutting down. The 
reactor was most unstable at these 
conditions, and the operators had to make 
constant adjustments to maintain the power 
level. 
 
When the turbine was tripped for the start of 
the test, four of the cooling water pumps 
were switched off, which would have caused 
a reactor trip had the protective circuits not 
been disconnected. The reduced coolant flow 
caused water to boil rapidly in the pressure 
tubes which, because of a specific feature of 
the reactor design, caused a power surge 
(estimated at 100 times nominal power). 
This was only made worse when the 
operators belatedly attempted to insert the 
control rods. The sudden increase in 
temperature caused the reactor to overheat, 
fuel rods burst and the coolant water flashed 
to steam. The high pressure blew the 1000 
ton biological shield off the top of the 
reactor, rupturing all the pressure tubes and 
exposing the hot core to the atmosphere. 
Large quantities of activity were released 
and contaminated the surrounding 
countryside, with lesser (but significant) 
amounts being dispersed over parts of 
Western Europe. 
 
Thirty one reactor staff and emergency 
workers died in the accident or shortly 
afterwards as a result of receiving acute  
radiation doses. An IAEA report published in 
2005 concludes that up to four thousand 
people could eventually die of radiation 
exposure from the accident63. The Green 
Party submission to the EAC Inquiry (Keeping 
the Lights On, 2005) quotes Kofi Annan, UN 
Secretary General as saying (July 2004) that 
it will be at least 2016 before the full 
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number of those likely to develop serious 
medical conditions as a result of Chernobyl is 
known. 
 
While the accident can be attributed to the 
the many violations of safety procedures as 
the operators were under pressure to 
perform the experiment at that time. If the 
test had been aborted, it could not, 
apparently, have been repeated for another 
year. The RBMK had a major design fault 
which led to instability at low power: a 
similar incident occurred at Ignalina in 1983, 
with much less severe consequences, but 
the experience was not passed on to the 
personnel at Chernobyl. Finally, the 
communication between the personnel 
conducting the test and those responsible for 
operating the reactor seems to have been 
inadequate. 
 
In the UK, experiments on reactor plant are 
specifically covered by SLC 22, which 
requires the licensee to make ‘adequate 
arrangements to control any modification or 
experiment ... which may affect safety’ - 
similar to restraints under the Soviet 
Gosatomnadzor system. All such 
modifications or experiments are categorised 
according to their safety significance, on the 
basis of the consequences if they were 
‘inadequately conceived or executed’. They 
are subjected to progressively increasing 
amounts of scrutiny. Those with the highest 
category, where ‘inadequate conception or 
execution’ would lead to a ‘serious increase 
in the risk of a radiological hazard’, must be 
approved by the NII as well as by the 
station’s Nuclear Safety Committee (NSC)xxii. 
The NSC includes members that are not 
employed by the generating company and 
are therefore less liable to be pressured in 
any particular direction. Any proposal where 
‘inadequate conception or execution’ would 
lead to a ‘significant but less serious increase 
in risk’ will at least require the agreement of 
independent nuclear safety assessors within 
the company. The experiment would be 
xxii The establishment of a Nuclear Safety 
Committee is itself a Site Licence Condition 
(SLC 13). 
controlled to strict procedures, and any 
major deviation (e.g. the requirement to 
continue generating for longer than 
envisaged) would have led to the test being 
aborted. It is extremely unlikely, therefore, 
that a situation as occurred at Chernobyl 
would ever have been allowed to develop in 
the UK. 
 
10.2 Three Mile Island (INES 5) 
(adapted from 64) 
The accident to Three Mile Island Reactor 2 
happened at 0400 on 28 March, 1979, when 
the reactor was operating at 97% power. A 
relatively minor malfunction in the 
secondary cooling circuit caused the 
temperature in the primary coolant to rise 
and resulted in the reactor shutting down 
automatically. Within seconds of the 
shutdown, the pilot-operated relief valve 
(PORV) on the reactor cooling system 
opened, as it was supposed to, to relieve 
pressure in the circuit. It was supposed to 
close again after ten seconds but failed to do 
so. The operators believed that the valve 
had re-closed, since the instruments showed 
that a ‘close’ signal had been sent to the 
valve (there was no instrumentation to show 
the valve’s actual position). 
 
Since the PORV remained open, water from 
the primary circuit continued to leak into the 
reactor coolant drain tank, which resulted in 
water being pumped into the reactor system 
to compensate for the loss. As water and 
steam escaped through the PORV, cooling 
water surged into the pressuriser (a large 
pressure vessel that is part of the primary 
circuit and prevents the primary coolant 
water from boiling), causing the level to 
increase. Believing that the system had too 
much water in it, the operators reduced the 
flow of make-up water, which had been 
cooling the reactor core. Eventually they shut 
down the cooling pumps altogether, due to 
excessive vibrations. The water then boiled 
away, partly uncovering the reactor core and 
causing the fuel to overheat. Most of the fuel 
core was severely damaged  and released 
radioactive material into the cooling water. 
A high-temperature reaction took place 
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between the fuel pin material (zircaloy) and 
the water, resulting in the formation of 
hydrogen. 
 
It was eventually realised that the PORV had 
stuck open, and measures were taken to 
isolate it. One cooling pump was re-started, 
and cooling of the overheated core was 
restored. The hydrogen gas was periodically 
vented because of the perceived risk of 
explosion (a hydrogen burn did occur several 
hours into the accident, but a more 
damaging explosion was avoided). A month 
later, the operators were able to establish 
natural coolant circulation and were able to 
shut down the cooling pumps. However, the 
almost-new reactor was written off and 
removal of the badly-damaged fuel took 
until 1991 (about 1% of the fuel and 
associated debris remains in the vessel, in 
inaccessible locations). 
 
Measurements taken around the plant at the 
time of the accident and afterwards showed 
that radiation releases (those resulting from 
periodic venting of the containment) were 
minimal, and the maximum offsite dose was 
probably 1 mSv (about one-third of the 
average background received by US 
residents each year). The average dose to 
people living within ten miles was 0.08 mSv, 
equivalent to one chest X-ray. However, 
inaccurate reporting of plant events (via 
state and federal agencies) caused a mass 
exodus of the local population over the 
weekend of 31 March - 1 April. The only 
detectable health effect on the local 
population was psychological stress during 
and shortly after the accident, and no long-
term health effects have been detected. 
 
The accident was caused by the operators 
misinterpreting a plant malfunction and, as a 
result, taking measures that only made the 
situation worse. Plant instrumentation has 
since been improved considerably, and 
operator training has been refocussed on 
maintaining core cooling regardless of the 
initiating event, following a ‘symptom-
based’ approach. The use of simulators to 
test the operators on various accident 
scenarios has become routine. 
 
10.3 The Windscale fire (INES 5) 
(although others regard this as INES 7, 
adapted from 65) 
On 7 October, 1957, plutonium pile no.1 at 
Windscale was shut down for a routine fuel 
element change. This was a routine 
operation, but there were plans to modify 
the moveable atmospheric scanning gear, 
which was used to detect any failed fuel and 
was known to jam at high temperatures. 
This work was to have been done before the 
reactor next went critical, however the 
reactor was started up again that evening 
without the work being done. It was normal 
practice to establish criticality at low power 
during shutdown periods, to raise the 
graphite temperature and release Wigner 
Energyxxiii. The pile was again shut down the 
following morning, but some time 
afterwards some core temperature 
instruments indicated a falling temperature. 
The operators concluded that the Wigner 
release had not been established, and took 
the pile critical again for further heating. 
The rate of temperature increase was clearly 
excessive, and the operators quickly shut the 
core down. However, the temperatures 
failed to stabilise, and the air cooling flow 
was increased in an attempt to bring them 
down. On 10 October, a high activity alarm 
was generated, and further measurements 
showed that at least one fuel element had 
failed, causing radioactive particles to be 
released via the tall ventilation stack. 
Investigations showed that the fuel 
elements in one channel were glowing red 
hot, and had jammed in the channel. The 
surrounding fuel channels were cleared, and 
xxiii Wigner energy is generated when graphite is 
irradiated and its shape changes. When the 
distorted material is able to regain its original 
shape there is a spontaneous release of this 
energy and an increase in graphite temperature. 
The only means of heating the graphite to 
achieve the Wigner release temperature is by 
operating the pile at an elevated temperature to 
trigger the release and then, as the Wiger energy 
is released, progressively closing down the pile’s 
nuclear activity to maintain steady state 
temperature conditions.  
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the fire was eventually put out using carbon 
dioxide and then water. 
 
Radioactivity was released over the 
surrounding area of west Cumberland, 
resulting in a ban being imposed on the 
consumption of milk produced in a 500 km2 
area (this was because enhanced levels of 
radioactive Iodine-131 were considered 
excessive for children). The control area was 
progressively reduced and all restrictions 
were lifted by 23 November. 
The cause of the accident was considered to 
be the second nuclear heating, which caused 
the cladding of a considerable number, some 
of which have never been recovered,  to fail. 
Not all the temperature recordings had 
shown the temperature to be falling, and 
some of the instruments were considered to 
be badly positioned for monitoring Wigner 
release. The enquiry into the accident 
recommended, amongst other things, fitting 
six hundred extra temperature sensors to the 
undamaged Pile 2 (Pile 1 having been 
written off) and adopting an alternative 
method of releasing Wigner energy. In 
practice, Pile 2, which had been shut down 
following the accident, was not re-started 
because the modifications were judged to be 
either uneconomic or because nobody was 
prepared to take the risk of another 
uncontrolled Wigner energy release – the No 
2 pile remains today in this ‘Wigner charged’ 
condition . 
 
10.4 Saint-Laurent A2 (INES 4) 
(from 66, translated into English) 
On 13 March 1980, a metal plate inside the 
reactor dropped onto the graphite core, 
because of corrosion, and blocked the carbon 
dioxide coolant flow to twelve fuel channels. 
The fuel elements in the channels 
overheated and two of them melted. The 
reactor was safely shut down and the 
damaged fuel was removed. Repairs to the 
reactor took around two and a half years, 
and the reactor then operated until 1992. 
There was no off-site release of activity. 
 
10.5 Tokai criticality accident 
(INES 4) 
(from 67) 
On 30 September 1999, an accident occurred 
at the Tokai works of JCO Company Ltd. JCO’s 
main business was the conversion of 
enriched uranium hexafluoride to uranium 
dioxide for light water reactor (LWR) fuel, 
but it also occasionally produced purified 
uranyl nitrate solution for the Joyo 
experimental fast reactor. The approved 
procedure was to dissolve purified uranium 
oxide powder with nitric acid in a dissolution 
column, ensuring a batch size below 2.4 kg 
uranium. However, the procedure had been 
amended over the years, and JCO staff had 
for some time dissolved the oxide powder in 
a bucket, and mixed several batches in a 
larger storage tank, to ensure a uniform 
(homogenised) product.xxiv  On this occasion, 
a still larger precipitation vessel was usedxxv.  
After seven batches of liquid had been 
added to the tank, with an estimated mass 
of 16.8 kg uranium, a critical mass was 
attained and a reaction took place in the 
tank. The three workers carrying out the 
process received high doses of radiation. The 
reaction was terminated some 20 hours later 
by draining water from the cooling jacket 
surrounding the tank. In the meantime 
residents within a 350 m radius of the 
factory had been evacuated, and those living 
within 10 km were advised to stay indoors. 
In practice, doses to workers (except the 
three involved in the accident) and to local 
xxiv The importance of this is that the critical mass 
(above which a self-sustaining chain reaction will 
occur) is based not just on the mass of material 
but on the shape. Neutrons will escape more 
readily (and therefore be lost to the chain 
reaction) if the surface area is large, 
consequently a long, thin shape is better (for a 
given mass) than a squat one. 
xxv This met the customer’s requirement for 40 
litres of solution to be homogenised in one batch. 
The approved cross-blending method required 
10% to be taken from each of ten 4 litre 
containers, and subdivided into another ten 
containers. This was clearly more time-
consuming, but ensured that all batches 
remained sub-critical. 
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inhabitants remained within safe levels. 
However, two of the workers (one who had 
been pouring the solution and one who held 
the funnel) suffered severe radiation 
sickness, and died about three months and 
seven months later. 
 
The process amendments had never been 
authorized, and those processes latterly in 
place had not been reviewed by a 
competent authority. Furthermore, JCO had 
no procedures in place for obtaining 
approval for process changes. Staff had, in 
effect, acted on their own initiative. Since 
the process was only required infrequently, 
it had not been covered in safety inspections 
which had taken place when the plant was 
shut down. There were also licensing 
deficiencies, in that reviews had focussed 
mainly on the design integrity of the 
equipment, rather than on what it was being 
used for. It was perhaps fortunate that the 
storage tanks that had been used previously 
had a favourable (long and thin) geometry, 
otherwise such an incident might have 
occurred in previous campaigns where the 
process had been amended from what had 
been approved. 
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